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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. On 28 February 2008, the Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM), under the mediation of the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR), signed an agreement to end the political violence that followed the 
disputed December 2007 elections. Through mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of 
Eminent African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan, the parties agreed 
to form a coalition government and thereafter undertake far-reaching reforms to secure 
sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. 
2. South Consulting has been monitoring the implementation of the KNDR agreements from 
2008. This report focuses on two issues that have risen in prominence and drawn attention 
since the last quarter of 2010: the International Criminal Court investigation of the Kenya 
situation, and the implementation of the New Constitution. Previous reports can be found at 
www.dialoguekenya.org. 
3. The report has utilized both quantitative and qualitative data. A baseline survey of 9,200 
respondents was carried out in the 47 counties in December 2010 and a follow-up survey of 
2000 respondents was conducted in March 2011 in the same counties. Qualitative interviews 
were conducted in all parts of the country with key informants drawn from government 
ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations, the media and the 
general public. Secondary sources have also been reviewed for additional information. 
FINDINGS  
4. The socio-political and security situation in Kenya has improved considerably, compared to 
what it was in 2008 and 2009. There is peace and calm in the country. Public perception of 
personal safety has increased, with as large a proportion of the population as 72 per cent 
saying they feel safer now than they did in 2008. Life is also much better for many people. 
However, people in northern Kenya feel less safe than those in the rest of the country. It is 
possible that endemic conflicts over resources and food insecurity are responsible for these 
feelings of insecurity. 
 
5. Political violence ended with the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Agreement. However, sustaining the peace and calm that was secured depends on only one 
major factor: how political leaders reconcile their differences as the country moves towards 
the next General Election, and specifically how they organise their politics for presidential 
contests. National level political dynamics will influence local level issues; conflicts will 
trickle to the local level and disrupt inter-ethnic relations. There is thus need to manage 
national level political divisions to prevent a recurrence of violence. 
 
The ICC and Post-election Violence 
6. Findings show that divisions within the Grand Coalition Government have created an 
opportunity for impunity to re-organise and undermine progressive reforms and 
interventions aimed at ending impunity. In this review period, the fight against impunity has 
been personalised, politicised and ethnicised. This has polarised the fight against impunity 
and the need to find justice for victims. The polarisation has specifically obscured the 
objectives of the fight against injustice and created an amnesia around the question of justice 
vi  
  
 
for victims such as IDPs. Further, new political alliances are emerging not based on the need 
to deepen reforms that would prevent recurrence of another violent conflict but rather on 
the need to use ethnic platforms to promote and protect the political careers of particular 
individuals considered to be regional leaders. A tone for divisive ethno-political mobilisation 
reminiscent of the eve of 2007 general election is very much evident. This tone has 
jettisoned the debate on real reforms that the country should urgently pursue before the next 
general elections. The debate for reforms is being abandoned rapidly and replaced with a 
debate on succession politics. 
7. Many Kenyans are supportive of the ICC process and are happy that the ICC has finally 
embarked on the process to hold accountable those suspected to be most responsible. Over 
70 per cent of respondents in a national survey confident that the ICC will prosecute those 
suspected of perpetrating violence. These hopes sprout in place of widespread public 
disillusionment with the failure to complete investigations required to prosecute cases 
arising out of the post-election violence and the failure to establish a local Special Tribunal 
to investigate and prosecute high-level perpetrators.  Nonetheless, 81% of Kenyans want 
other perpetrators of violence tried. They do not want them forgiven. In fact only 7% want 
them forgiven.  This high number of Kenyans, 81%, who want perpetrators of violence tried 
is a pointer that many Kenyans want to address the past. They would want to see a Kenya 
free of impunity and injustice; they do not want people to be forgiven.   
8. The ICC Prosecutor’s naming of six suspects in relation to the post-election violence, has 
evolved new political dynamics. In addition to consolidation of new political alliances, this 
triggered high-level demands for Kenya to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the convention 
that established the ICC. Later, there were demands for deferral with Kenya seeking support 
from the African Union and the United Nations Security Council to support this course to 
defer the cases at ICC. This quest to defer the cases contrasts sharply with high public 
demand for prosecution of all perpetrators and high confidence in the ICC intervention. 
There is, thus, a disconnect between the political elite and ordinary citizens in terms of how 
to deal with post-election violence cases.  
9. Generally, the public is not in sync with the political elite, who appear to have a common 
interest in opposing accountability and other measures to end impunity. The behaviour of 
politicians demonstrates a business-as-usual political culture and preference for status quo. 
On the other hand, there is a strong public mood against impunity.  
10. The naming of suspects has evolved discourses in which some communities claim to be 
under siege. There are new discourses of victimisation and isolation among some political 
elites. They are also mobilising their ethnic constituencies along these discourses. This has 
created a new impetus for ethno-political alignments. Politicians allied to the six suspects 
named by the ICC Prosecutor have since begun consolidating or forming new ethn0-political 
alliances in preparation for the 2012 elections. The politicisation of ICC indictments has 
obscured the need for dialogue on reforms that would prevent future violence and how to 
hold perpetrators accountable. Generally, there is limited amount of debate on reforms and 
how to move forward in line with reforms agreed upon during the signing of the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreements (popularly referred to as the National 
Accord). 
Resettlement of IDPs 
11. Measures to resolve the humanitarian crisis remain tenuous as Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) remain in camps, urban informal settlements and other settings. Landlessness, 
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corruption and lack of social cohesion remain the main challenges to finding lasting 
solutions to IDPs. Some local communities have resisted the resettlement of IDPs on land 
they perceive as belonging to them only. 
12. Although the government and humanitarian agencies provided funds for start-ups, 
reconstruction of homes and even the purchase of land to resettle some IDPs, the crisis of 
displacement is yet to be conclusively resolved. The issue has become a source of political 
capital for national level political leaders as well as for leaders in areas where IDPs were 
displaced from, and among ethnic communities whose members are IDPs. As argued in the 
previous reports, IDPs’ problems tended to receive very little attention. Its one problem that 
lacks leadership in terms of how it should be resolved. Its only mentioned when politicians 
wish to generate political capital out of it.  Three years after the signing of the National 
Accord is a long time to have IDPs unsettled and/or in camps. This problem of IDPs thus 
remains a pointer to extent of reconciliation and extent of commitment to reforms in 
general. 
13. Inter-communal relations in areas where IDPs live have improved. Many reported that 
people relate well. 30 per cent of Kenyans say a lot of reconciliation has taken place among 
Kenyans. Another 53 per cent say just a little reconciliation has taken place. These responses 
imply that reconciliation is gradually occurring, but it has not been sufficient to ensure the 
safe return of IDPs in a sustainable manner. This suggests a need for more elaborate 
approaches to social reconciliation. 
Cohesion in Government  
14. The Coalition Government continues to face cohesion challenges. Suspicions and lack of 
trust continue to characterise relations between the two parties in the Grand Coalition 
Government. Although initial differences were between the two parties, parochial and 
narrow short-term interests have gradually factionalised them thereby increasing 
incoherence within government.  
 
15. The state of flux in the factionalised parties is likely to increase as the 2012 General Election 
approaches. Again this has the potential to threaten implementation of key reforms, 
including implementation of the New Constitution. Fault lines within the Cabinet continue 
to recur and the image of a divided government —especially that of ‘two-governments-in-
one’ - has not been effectively addressed because these differences continue to be reflected in 
key decisions. There are generally no drivers of coherence in government. New dynamics 
such as the politics of ICC and succession politics appear to suggest that these divisions will 
continue to hold until the next general elections. In fact as many as 58 per cent Kenyans feel 
the Coalition has a hard time working together to implement the new Constitution. 
However, Kenyans generally would like the Coalition Government to remain in office until 
the next general election 
16. But Kenyans are not dismissive of the Coalition Government. They are happy with the 
Coalition because it secured peace and has gone on to deliver a New Constitution. They are 
happy that the situation has normalised but have worried about the infighting. They also 
want the Coalition to remain until the next general election. But power sharing is not 
something many people would like to see in the future, with 75 per cent of Kenyans saying 
they would not recommend power sharing between political parties in government after 
another election. However, they are unhappy with the Coalition Government because it has 
failed to, among other things, fight corruption, promote unity within the government, and 
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tackle tribalism. They also think that power sharing between PNU and ODM is still relevant.  
Implementation of the New Constitution 
17. The New Constitution has revived optimism for an improved governance culture and hopes 
for the well being for the people of Kenya. The Constitution introduced a wide range of 
changes in government, the legislature, judiciary and all sectors of society. Up to 54 per cent 
of respondents believe their lives will be better. Many want the government to use the New 
Constitution to provide security, jobs, and tackle corruption. In this regard, there is need to 
adhere to the implementation schedule and avail needed financial resources.  
 
18. But there are challenges to implementation. There is no public debate or dialogue on major 
policy issues. There is absence of civic education and not many people are involved in 
discussing its implementation. Citizens also cite political interests, corruption and lack of 
cohesion in Government as the main threats to implementation. They note that vested 
interests, especially in Parliament, will continue to threaten the passing of laws. It is notable 
that because of vested interests, establishing critical bodies such as the Constitution 
Implementation Commission (CIC) and the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) was 
delayed for about a month. It is also notable that several bills have been drafted and are 
awaiting final debate before enactment. Speed is of essence at this stage. Any delay in 
enactment of the fundamental laws will slow the high speed required in implementation of 
critical reforms before the next general election. 
 
19. The New Constitution is an omnibus carrying the hope of resolving issues that, if not 
completely resolved, would potentially lead to another conflict. It carries a collection of 
issues lumped together under the mediation’s Agenda 4, which included, among others 
institutional and legal reforms, land reforms, poverty, inequity and regional imbalances, 
youth unemployment, ethnicity or national cohesion and unity, as well as entrenching 
accountability and ending impunity. Hiccups in implementing the New Constitution sound a 
death knell for these long-term issues, signalled as the underlying causes of the post-2007 
election crisis and which must be resolved for the future stability of Kenya. 
 
20. The challenges to implementation place the country on a perilous path as it hurtles towards 
another election without establishing and securing critical institutions necessary to manage 
political transitions. These include the new electoral management body, resolution of the 
delineation of boundaries, and the establishment of a fully functioning judiciary as envisaged 
in the New Constitution. 
 
21. How these institutions are established will determine the level of confidence and trust that 
people will have in them.  They must be established in a manner that is transparent and 
credible, and most importantly, in line with the values and principles of the New 
Constitution of Kenya. Appointing people on basis of party and/or ethnic consideration will 
undermine the credibility of these institutions. On the whole, people’s involvement in 
oversight of the process is crucial to sustain momentum for implementation of the 
constitution, and delivery on the balance of Agenda 4 reforms. 
 
Conclusion 
22. The New Constitution has revived optimism for a different, more responsive governance 
culture. The Constitution carries the hope of resolving all issues identified under Agenda 
Item 4 and in particular the underlying factors that contributed to the post-2007 election 
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violence.  But there are fresh challenges to the implementation of the New Constitution. 
Vested interests and an old political culture, as well as short-term and narrow interests, are 
threatening the full implementation of the constitution. If not effectively managed, short 
term focus and interests, combined with the lack of cohesion within Government, and lack of 
leadership to manage political divisions, could fail the country again.  
 
23. The framework for reforms is very much in place. Several institutions have already been 
established and relevant legislation formulated. However, speed is required to pass the 
remaining bills to build a strong foundation for implementation of the constitution. 
 
24. The majority of voters supported the New Constitution. They gave it legitimacy by approving 
it in large numbers. They aspired to see a new Kenya and a fresh start. They voted for new 
values and principles of governance. They elected to have ethical leadership and responsible 
leaders. Failing to live by the spirit and the values embraced by the new constitution will 
disillusion the public, with adverse consequences. There is a need for strong vigilance by 
everyone on the implementation process because this an important opportunity to build a 
new society. 
 
25. Civic education on the New Constitution is required as a matter of urgency to build both 
demands by citizens and awaken the government to what its institutions are required to 
supply. The demand for civic education is huge and therefore will require joint provision by 
the government, the CIC, civil society and other actors. The Cabinet has supported provision 
of civic education in this regard. Institutions, materials and strategies for delivery should be 
rolled out fast to deepen the momentum to pursue the principles and values of the New 
Constitution.  
 
26. Although the ICC process has introduced certain challenges, it presents an important 
opportunity for reforms. The process is laying the groundwork for fighting impunity and 
ensuring that people account for their actions. Although some political leaders are unified in 
their efforts to oppose the ICC process, the ordinary people are not with them. They perceive 
the ICC process as the last resort in fighting impunity and getting justice for victims.  
 
27. Kenyans want a local judicial process to try middle and lower level perpetrators. They want 
justice for victims and they want people to account for their actions. There is a need then to 
begin establishing a framework to try other perpetrators because the ICC will not deal with 
everyone identified as a perpetrator.  
 
 
 
 
 1.  INTRODUCTION    
 
1. This is a periodic report on the progress of implementing reforms under the Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement of 2008, signed between the 
Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
following the dispute over the December 2007 presidential election result and the 
subsequent violence. Through mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities led by Mr Kofi Annan, the parties committed to achieve the KNDR goal 
of ‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for 
human rights’.  
2. The two parties agreed to tackle four main issues expressed as Agenda items 1-4: These 
were2: 
a. Agenda Item 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights 
and liberties; 
b. Agenda Item 2: Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis and 
promote healing and reconciliation; 
c. Agenda Item 3: How to overcome the political crisis; and 
d. Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues, including constitutional and 
institutional reforms, land reforms, poverty and inequalities, youth 
unemployment, national cohesion, and transparency and accountability. 
3. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the KNDR agreements from 2008. 
Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. This report covers the last quarter of 
2010.  
4. This report is the first report to track reforms after the promulgation of the New 
Constitution of Kenya in August 2010. It covers the period between November 2010 and 
March 2011. The report has utilised both quantitative and qualitative data. In December 
2010, quantitative data was collected through a national survey comprising 9,200 
respondents drawn from across all the 47 counties established under the New Constitution. 
A smaller survey of 2000 respondents was conducted in March 2011 in the same number of 
counties. This presentation focuses, therefore, on the county as well as the national level. 
5. Qualitative data was obtained through interviews with key informants drawn from 
Government ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations, the media 
and the general public. Secondary information was obtained by reviewing reports and 
documents by the Government, development agencies, the media and non-governmental 
bodies. 
6. The review is based on data and recognises too well that political interests and realities are 
sensitive to analyses of implementation of reforms. In writing the report, therefore, we have 
taken care to remain objective and let the data to speak. 
7. The report is organised into four main parts corresponding to the respective agenda items. 
                                                 
1. The Annotated Agenda and Timetable for KNDR signed on 1 February 2008 viewed Agendas 1, 2 and 3 as ‘short term’ 
actionable problems to be addressed within a period of 7-15 days from the date of commencement of the dialogue, and Agenda 
4 as a long term programme to be resolved within a period of one year. 
 
2  
  
 
However, the main emphasis in all the parts is the issue of implications of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) investigation of the Kenya situation; and implementation of the New 
Constitution. The report also contains two annexes. Annex 1 – National Baseline Survey 
conducted in December 2010; and Annex 2 – National Baseline Survey (select findings) by 
county. The report is organised as follows: 
e. Part II: The ICC and the Post-election Violence 
f. Part III: The ICC and Implication for IDPs 
g. Part IV: The ICC and Implications for Political Cohesion 
h. Part V: Challenges to the New Constitution  
i. Part VI: Conclusion 
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2. THE ICC AND POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE  
 
Introduction 
8. The KNDR agreement outlined measures the Government, the police, the media and the 
public needed to undertake to halt the violence, guarantee security for all Kenyans and 
restore fundamental rights and liberties. A Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV or the Waki Commission3) was established. It recommended the setting up 
of a Special Tribunal for Kenya to investigate and try those responsible for the most serious 
criminal acts during the crisis period.  
 
9. The Waki Commission also recommended handing over suspects to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) if the government failed to set up the Special Tribunal. After several 
unsuccessful attempts to set up this mechanism within the specified timeframes, the matter 
was handed over to the ICC in July 2009. On 15 December 2010, the ICC Chief Prosecutor 
announced that he was seeking summons for six persons suspected to bear the greatest 
responsibility for crimes committed during the post-election violence (PEV). The 
summonses were issued for the suspects to appear before the ICC on 7-8 April 2011. 
 
10. This section of the report looks at the effect of ICC investigation on the Kenya situation thus 
far. The report also examines its implications for peace and security. The problem of illegal 
armed groups is also discussed.    
 
Key Findings 
Summary of findings 
• Naming of six suspects draws mixed reactions and deepens divisions within 
the Coalition Government 
• Politicisation of the ICC intervention increases impetus for ethno-political 
alliances ahead of 2012 elections 
• There is a disconnect between the political elite and ordinary citizens with 
regard to the fight against impunity 
• The ICC intervention continues to enjoy high public confidence 
• In addition to the ICC intervention, Kenyans want a local mechanism to 
prosecute low-level perpetrators of violence 
The State of Peace and Security 
11. By the end of 2010 and early 2011, there was consensus in all counties of Kenya that the 
socio-political situation had improved and was far better than it was in the post-election 
violence period. Political violence ended after the signing of the National Accord. Although 
2009 witnessed increased insecurity in some areas, these incidents did not escalate and did 
not result from political conflicts relating to the 2007 General Election. 
 
12. In many counties, respondents observed that there was peace and calm. Many also said they 
felt much safer than in 2008 and 2009. For instance, when asked what they felt about their 
                                                 
3 so named after Justice Philip Waki, who chaired the Commission. 
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lives, only 9 per cent of the respondents said life was not good at all. Another 30 per cent 
said life was not very good. However, close to 50 per cent said life was just good and another 
12 per cent said life was very good. 
Figure 1: Thinking about your life at present, which of the following is applicable? (December 2010) 
My life currently is very good
My life currently is just good
My life currently is not very good
My life currently is not good at all
12%
49%
30%
9%
Thinking about your life at present, which of the following is 
applicable?
 
13. A trend analysis from 2008 to Dec. 2010 also shows that many people believe the situation 
in the country is better today.  Up to 64 per cent of Kenyans believe that life is far better now 
than was it was in 2008 and 2009. The number of people who feel the situation is worse 
decreased from 76 per cent in August 2009 to 59 per cent in February 2010. Only 18 per cent 
held this view by the end of 2010. 
 
Figure 2: Thinking about Kenya today compared to just after the 2007 general election, 
 has the situation become better, worse, or stayed the same? 
 
 
14. The feelings of a better life and the situation in the country are again reflected in how people 
feel about safety. Asked what they think about safety now compared to just after the 2007 
elections, 72 per cent of respondents said they felt safer. The people who feel that life is the 
same are almost equal in number to those who feel it is less safe, at 14 and 13 per cent, 
respectively.  
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Figure 3: Thinking of your safety now compared to just after the 2007 elections,  
do you feel safer, less safe, or about the same? 
 Thinking of your safety now compared to just after the 
2007 general elections, do you feel safer, less safe, or 
about the same?
 
 
15. The number of people feeling safer has been increasing since 2008. This corroborates the 
findings on feelings about improvement of life and security in general. 
 
Figure 4: Thinking about your safety now compared to just after the 2007 elections,  
do you feel safer, less safer or about the same? 
 
 
16. Although 64 per cent of Kenyans feel the situation is better now, the Coast region has more 
people who feel less safe: 41 per cent of the respondents. Less than half the population in 
Lamu and Tana River counties do not feel safer than they did after the 2007 elections.  
 
17. Counties in northern Kenya feel less safe compared to other areas of the country. Banditry, 
resource conflicts, food insecurity and external incursions by foreign militia contribute to 
this feeling in these counties. Counties affected by the post-election violence, however, have 
many people feeling safer and thinking that life is better than it was after the 2007 elections.  
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Table 1: Thinking about Kenya today compared to the time of the 2007 General Election,  
has the situation become better, worse, or stayed the same? (by county) 
County Better Worse Stayed 
about the 
same 
 County Better Worse Stayed 
about the 
same 
KIRINYAGA 69% 18% 9% KISUMU 60% 19% 21% 
MURANG'A 74% 17% 10% MIGORI 56% 31% 12% 
NYANDARUA 73% 14% 12% SIAYA 65% 15% 19% 
NYERI 78% 12% 11% KISII 53% 30% 15% 
KIAMBU 70% 8% 21% NYAMIRA 62% 23% 15% 
KILIFI 35% 30% 32% BARINGO 69% 17% 13% 
MOMBASA 45% 30% 25% BOMET 54% 26% 20% 
KWALE 41% 30% 27% KAJIADO 72% 14% 14% 
LAMU 36% 22% 42% KERICHO 61% 20% 17% 
TAITA TAVETA 40% 23% 33% NANDI 59% 32% 9% 
TANA RIVER 54% 23% 21% NAROK 63% 22% 14% 
EMBU 51% 32% 17% TRANS NZOIA 48% 31% 21% 
MAKUENI 68% 7% 26% TURKANA 85% 11% 5% 
KITUI 73% 17% 8% UASIN GISHU 61% 21% 18% 
MACHAKOS 73% 10% 17% WEST POKOT 45% 30% 24% 
MERU 81% 10% 9% NAKURU 75% 16% 9% 
ISIOLO 80% 6% 13% ELGEYO/MARAKWET 56% 26% 18% 
MARSABIT 46% 9% 44% LAIKIPIA 75% 12% 14% 
THARAKA 77% 12% 11% SAMBURU 70% 8% 22% 
NAIROBI 66% 17% 17% BUSIA 60% 20% 18% 
GARISSA 72% 6% 21% VIHIGA 73% 17% 8% 
WAJIR 43% 16% 40% BUNGOMA 72% 12% 15% 
MANDERA 66% 13% 21% KAKAMEGA 70% 10% 19% 
HOMA BAY 68% 20% 11%     
 
18. These findings corroborate what previous surveys revealed regarding fear of violence 
recurring: many Kenyans are confident violence is not likely to recur. In December 2010, 64 
per cent of the population did not think there would be violence around the next General 
Election. Only a small number – 12 per cent – thought there would be violence while 23 per 
cent were not certain.  
 
19. Kenyans feel that rising crime and youth unemployment, rather than political violence 
relating to the ICC process, presents the greatest threat to security. The Annual Crime 
Report, 2010, shows a 5 per cent decrease in all categories of crime. However, it also shows a 
relatively high increase of crime in places such as Nairobi and North Eastern. This could be 
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attributed to the high unemployment rates, inequitable distribution of resources, organised 
crime, drug and substance abuse, high illiteracy and access to sophisticated technology.4 The 
survey carried out in the 47 counties shows that 34 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, 
regard youth unemployment and crime as the greatest threat to security.  
Table 2: What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live? 
What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live? 
Lack of police presence 9% 
Youth unemployment 34% 
Crime, e.g., robbery 27% 
Tribalism 6% 
There are no threats 21% 
Drug abuse 1% 
 
20. All the regions of the country identify youth unemployment and crime as the greatest threats 
to security. Tribalism is significant as a factor in Northern Kenya.  
 
Table 3: What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live 
 – Analysis by region 
What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live? 
 Central Coast Eastern Nairobi North 
Eastern 
Nyanza R/Valley Western 
Lack of police 
presence 
9% 6% 17% 8% 10% 10% 7% 5% 
Youth 
unemployment 
38% 32% 40% 32% 37% 38% 28% 37% 
Crime e.g. 
robbery 
29% 25% 21% 37% 9% 34% 27% 29% 
Tribalism 2% 6% 5% 5% 19% 4% 8% 5% 
There are no 
threats 
19% 26% 16% 17% 24% 13% 28% 23% 
         
 
21. The findings show that the political situation has normalised and that peace obtains in the 
country. Whether this is sustainable and, specifically, can be secured in the longer term is 
dependent on how politicians will begin organising campaigns for the next presidential 
election because violence often accompanies competition for the presidency. Sustainability 
of peace will also depend on the nature of national level political dynamics because conflicts 
between leaders tend to trickle down to the local level and ultimately affect inter-communal 
relations. It will also depend on whether action against impunity is taken and sustained. 
Furthermore, Agenda Item 4 reforms have not been comprehensively addressed yet the 
window for radical decisions will shut as the country moves towards the next General 
Election. 
                                                 
4 Government of Kenya, Annual Crime Report for the Year 2010, p.1 
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The ICC and the Kenya Situation 
22. The previous review report noted that since March 2010 when the Pre-Trial Chamber II of 
the International Criminal Court approved the Chief Prosecutor’s request to investigate the 
Kenya situation, political anxiety heightened threats against potential witnesses and 
institutions that have investigated the post election violence, including the Kenyan National 
Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR).5  
 
23. Secondly, political realignments emerged with a view to securing the interests and political 
careers of senior politicians. Thirdly, the reality of ICC intervention caused anxiety among 
influential leaders because this is the first time powerful individuals are publicly being held 
accountable through mechanisms that they have no control over. Since December 2010 
when the ICC Prosecutor named the six suspects, the political terrain has changed. Some 
leaders have used public spaces including the media and public rallies to claim that the ICC 
intervention is part of political calculations to eliminate their candidacy in the 2012 general 
elections.  
 
24. Acrimonious public spats between those supporting the ICC trials and those against it have 
roused ethnic sentiments, particularly because some say they were the real victims of the 
violence while others say their community is being targeted. Some have expressed concern 
about the omission of some leaders from areas such as Kisumu, where violence also 
occurred.6 Allegations that the ICC cases are politically-motivated has cast the debate in the 
light of 2012 politics and obscured the fight against impunity. A respondent in Nairobi 
remarked ‘The fear of exclusion from power in 2012 makes people anxious; it is introducing 
ethnic dimensions to the debate. If this political and ethnic discussion is allowed to 
continue, it will obliterate the real issues and present a real danger in 2012’7  
 
25. There had been fears that naming the suspects would lead to violence, especially in areas 
that witnessed intense violent conflicts. This did not materialise. People were not surprised 
by some of the names; the announcement confirmed public speculations honed over months 
especially because some politicians had began engaging the ICC on suspicion that they were 
targets of investigations. Furthermore, after their naming, these leaders implored their 
respective communities to be calm. Community elders, youth leaders and NGOs also called 
on people to be peaceful. However, continued ethnicization of the ICC debate is causing fear 
of violence among people at the local level.8  
 
Kenyans are supportive of the ICC 
26. The surveys reveal that Kenyans are very supportive of the ICC investigations. Interviews 
with key informants and ordinary people corroborate this finding. To some, the ICC action 
represents the only concrete action to hold powerful people accountable for post-election 
violence.9 Still, others are happy that the ICC has acted fast and argue that it is an important 
lesson to influential and powerful people who always perpetuate impunity by failing to 
                                                 
5 Interview with an official of KNCHR, 10 Nov 2010; also Daily Nation, ‘Ruto accuses rights body of coaching witnesses’ 9 Nov 2010, 
Press statement by KNCHR, 12 Nov 2010. 
6 FGD in Kericho County, 20 Dec 2010 
7 Interview with a university lecturer in Nairobi, 31 March 2011; also ‘ICC cases politically motivated: Interview with lawyer Kithure 
Kindiki’ reported in The Star, 4 April 2011, p. 24 
8 Wanyeki, M., ‘Back to the Future: Prepare for the worst in 2011’ The East African, 4-10 April, 2011, p. 16 
9 Interview with a government official, 17 Dec 2010  
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account for their actions.10  
 
27. Although some political elite have espoused solidarity with those named, ordinary citizens 
are happy that at last those suspected to bear the greatest responsibility and in particular 
senior people are being called to account. In December, as many as 78 per cent Kenyans 
were happy that ICC was conducting investigations. Figure 5 shows that only 15 per cent 
were somewhat/very unhappy with this development. 
Figure 5: How happy or unhappy are you that ICC is investigating – National level 
How happy or unhappy are you that the ICC is 
investigating perpetrators of post election violence?
Dec.-10
78%
15%
6%
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10%
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50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Very/somewhat happy Somewhat/very unhappy Don’t care/don’t know
 
 
28. However, counties in the Rift Valley region are the least happy with the ICC action. Up to 54 
per cent of respondents in Bomet County, 45 per cent in Kericho, and 32 per cent in Uasin 
Gishu County are unhappy that the ICC is investigating perpetrators of post-election 
violence. Earlier reports have shown that people in these regions prefer the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission to take action.  
                                                 
10 Interview with a human rights advocate in Uasin Gishu County, 24 Dec 2010 
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Table 4: How happy or unhappy with ICC – by county 
 
How happy or unhappy are you that the ICC is investigating perpetrators of post election violence? 
 
County Happy Not 
Happy 
Don't 
care 
DK  County Happy Not 
Happy 
Don't 
care 
DK 
KIRINYAGA 78% 13% 5% 3%   KISUMU 89% 8% 1% 2% 
MURANG'A 78% 13% 0% 8%   MIGORI 88% 9% 1% 2% 
NYANDARUA 85% 12% 0% 2%   SIAYA 87% 10% 1% 2% 
NYERI 78% 12% 6% 4%   KISII 75% 17% 0% 7% 
KIAMBU 83% 15% 1% 0%   NYAMIRA 89% 6% 0% 6% 
KILIFI 77% 7% 1% 15%   BARINGO 62% 31% 1% 4% 
MOMBASA 81% 16% 0% 2%   BOMET 35% 54% 3% 6% 
KWALE 79% 9% 2% 9%   KAJIADO 77% 18% 0% 6% 
LAMU 92% 7% 1% 0%   KERICHO 48% 45% 3% 4% 
TAITA 
TAVETA 
75% 8% 1% 16%   NANDI 65% 28% 3% 3% 
TANA RIVER 72% 12% 0% 16%   NAROK 71% 24% 0% 6% 
EMBU 87% 7% 2% 3%   TRANS NZOIA 74% 20% 2% 4% 
MAKUENI 88% 8% 0% 2%   TURKANA 88% 12% 0% 0% 
KITUI 89% 3% 0% 9%   UASIN GISHU 66% 32% 2% 1% 
MACHAKOS 83% 12% 1% 4%   WEST POKOT 50% 29% 5% 14% 
MERU 84% 10% 0% 6%   NAKURU 84% 10% 3% 2% 
ISIOLO 73% 2% 8% 17%   ELGEYO/MARAKWET 68% 31% 1% 0% 
MARSABIT 63% 29% 3% 5%   LAIKIPIA 78% 18% 4% 0% 
THARAKA 77% 21% 0% 2%   SAMBURU 56% 11% 1% 33% 
NAIROBI 89% 9% 0% 1%   BUSIA 74% 16% 2% 7% 
GARISSA 87% 4% 2% 6%   VIHIGA 87% 6% 1% 7% 
WAJIR 73% 14% 9% 4%   BUNGOMA 67% 25% 1% 7% 
MANDERA 90% 8% 0% 0%   KAKAMEGA 83% 12% 3% 2% 
HOMA BAY 86% 9% 1% 4%            
11
 
 
29. Overall, one quarter of the people in Rift Valley is somewhat/very unhappy with the ICC 
investigations. People in other regions – and counties – are very/somewhat happy with the 
investigations. Nairobi is leading at 89 per cent, followed by North Eastern and Nyanza at 85 
per cent each. 
                                                 
11
 RTA has been excluded 
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Figure 6: How happy or unhappy are you that the ICC is investigating perpetrators of post election 
violence (by region) 
 
 
30. People are also confident that the ICC will eventually prosecute those named as perpetrators 
of violence. Up to 69 per cent of respondents said they were confident that the ICC will do so 
-- 39 per cent being very confident and 33 per cent just confident. 24 per cent were not 
confident on prosecutions. 
Figure 7: Level of confidence in the ICC 
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31. The number of those who are confident about ICC prosecuting the perpetrators varies across 
the regions. North Eastern region has more people (82%) who are confident about the ICC. 
Western and Nyanza regions follow at 75 per cent. In Eastern Province, there are 74 per cent 
who are confident. Rift Valley has the least number of people – 60 per cent – who are 
confident that the ICC will prosecute those suspected to be responsible.  
 
32. In the Rift Valley and Central regions, where some of the people named by the ICC 
prosecutor come from, 33 per cent and 27 per cent respectively say they are not confident 
that ICC will prosecute these people.  
Figure 8: Confidence in the ICC (by region) 
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33. In many counties people are very confident that the ICC will prosecute the suspects. 
However, less than half the population in some counties in Rift Valley are confident in this 
regard. For instance, only 32 per cent in Bomet and 40 per cent in Kericho are confident that 
the ICC will prosecute these people. 
 
34. The level of confidence in the ICC remained high even after the naming of suspects. In 
March 2011, 72 per cent of the respondents expressed confidence that the ICC will prosecute 
the suspects: 
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Figure 9: Level of confidence in the ICC, March 2011 
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Table 5: Following the ICC chief prosecutor's investigations in Kenya, how confident are you that the ICC 
or The Hague will prosecute senior people who perpetrated post-election violence?12 
 County Confident Not 
Confident 
DK   
  
 County Confident Not 
Confident 
DK 
KIRINYAGA 66% 23% 10% KISUMU 80% 15% 5% 
MURANG'A 66% 25% 9% MIGORI 78% 20% 2% 
NYANDARUA 76% 21% 3% SIAYA 80% 15% 5% 
NYERI 69% 24% 7% KISII 61% 27% 11% 
KIAMBU 65% 32% 3% NYAMIRA 84% 14% 3% 
KILIFI 63% 16% 20% BARINGO 59% 31% 8% 
MOMBASA 65% 31% 4% BOMET 32% 56% 12% 
KWALE 67% 20% 14% KAJIADO 72% 21% 6% 
LAMU 77% 15% 7% KERICHO 40% 50% 10% 
TAITA 
TAVETA 
55% 24% 21% NANDI 62% 29% 10% 
TANA RIVER 69% 13% 18% NAROK 61% 31% 7% 
EMBU 60% 24% 16% TRANS NZOIA 61% 33% 6% 
MAKUENI 80% 14% 5% TURKANA 89% 11% 0% 
KITUI 82% 8% 10% UASIN GISHU 58% 39% 3% 
MACHAKOS 76% 18% 5% WEST POKOT 46% 38% 16% 
MERU 76% 16% 7% NAKURU 65% 29% 6% 
ISIOLO 69% 13% 18% ELGEYO/MAR
AKWET 
66% 31% 3% 
MARSABIT 51% 37% 11% LAIKIPIA 63% 36% 1% 
THARAKA 64% 33% 3% SAMBURU 43% 20% 37% 
NAIROBI 70% 28% 2% BUSIA 73% 19% 8% 
GARISSA 85% 5% 9% VIHIGA 86% 7% 7% 
WAJIR 73% 16% 11% BUNGOMA 67% 26% 7% 
MANDERA 85% 12% 3% KAKAMEGA 82% 15% 4% 
HOMA BAY 76% 18% 6%         
 
35. Confidence in the ICC has been increasing. Those who were confident increased from 52 per 
cent in May 2010 to 69 per cent in December 2010. As shown above, this number increased 
to 72 per cent at the end of March 2011. 
 
                                                 
12 RTA has been excluded 
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Figure 10: How confident are you that the ICC will prosecute senior people  
who perpetrated the post-election violence? 
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36. Although the majority said they are confident, 16 per cent of those who said they are not 
confident expressed concern that the ICC may fail to gather sufficient evidence to obtain 
convictions. Others thought the ICC process has been politicised and therefore unlikely to 
meet the objectives that resonate with the people of Kenya regarding the fight against 
impunity.  Some raised concern about possible bribery of witnesses and other actors as the 
trials progress.  
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Figure 11: Not confident in the ICC 
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37. The majority of the people will support the trials or do nothing if a senior politician from 
their community is held accountable for the post-election violence. with regard to them. A 
small percentage – around 4 per cent – will violently attack members of another community. 
In fact, the number of people who will support the trial has increased from around 52 per 
cent in May 2010 when people were not very confident that ICC would name suspects who 
bear the greatest responsibility to 69 per cent in December 2010 when people were certain 
that the ICC decision was firm.  
 
38. The survey also sought to find out how people and their communities would react in the 
event that senior people from their community would eventually be put on trial. Up to 64 per 
cent of respondents said they would support the trials and another 51 per cent thought 
members of their community would also support the trials. 
Figure 11: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election violence, 
how are you personally likely to react? 
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Figure 12: If a senior politician from your ethnic group (community) is put on trial,  
how are members of your community likely to react? 
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Table 6: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election 
violence, how would you react? (by county) 
  I would 
engage in 
acts of 
violence 
against 
other 
communities 
I would 
demonstrat
e against the 
trial 
I would 
suppor
t the 
trial 
I would 
do 
nothing 
 I would 
engage in 
acts of 
violence 
against 
other 
communitie
s 
I would 
demonstrat
e against the 
trial 
I would 
suppor
t the 
trial 
I would 
do 
nothin
g 
KIRINYAGA 0% 6% 77% 17% KISUMU 0% 4% 39% 56% 
MURANG'A 0% 14% 69% 16% MIGORI 3% 4% 71% 22% 
NYANDARUA 0% 4% 77% 18% SIAYA 0% 10% 59% 30% 
NYERI 0% 3% 72% 25% KISII 2% 5% 63% 27% 
KIAMBU 3% 14% 70% 12% NYAMIRA 0% 5% 74% 21% 
KILIFI 0% 4% 70% 24% BARINGO 0% 9% 54% 31% 
MOMBASA 1% 5% 68% 26% BOMET 8% 12% 32% 44% 
KWALE 0% 2% 60% 38% KAJIADO 1% 10% 66% 21% 
LAMU 0% 0% 69% 28% KERICHO 3% 14% 34% 47% 
TAITA 
TAVETA 
1% 1% 78% 16% NANDI 4% 6% 37% 51% 
TANA RIVER 0% 3% 74% 22% NAROK 2% 6% 60% 28% 
EMBU 0% 2% 79% 17% TRANS NZOIA 0% 9% 59% 30% 
MAKUENI 0% 3% 84% 12% TURKANA 10% 20% 65% 5% 
KITUI 1% 4% 63% 31% UASIN GISHU 1% 7% 43% 49% 
MACHAKOS 0% 5% 76% 19% WEST POKOT 3% 11% 53% 32% 
MERU 0% 2% 80% 15% NAKURU 1% 4% 58% 34% 
ISIOLO 1% 5% 49% 35% ELGEYO/MARAKWE
T 
1% 19% 35% 42% 
MARSABIT 0% 11% 47% 21% LAIKIPIA 2% 6% 71% 20% 
THARAKA 0% 9% 69% 16% SAMBURU 2% 3% 55% 35% 
NAIROBI 0% 5% 76% 19% BUSIA 0% 14% 57% 25% 
GARISSA 2% 6% 81% 11% VIHIGA 1% 5% 68% 25% 
WAJIR 4% 14% 65% 14% BUNGOMA 2% 9% 65% 20% 
MANDERA 1% 7% 77% 14% KAKAMEGA 4% 12% 56% 28% 
HOMA BAY 0% 8% 55% 36%      
 
39. It appears that many people would like the prosecution to take place. Many people would 
also like other perpetrators – the middle and lower level – to be tried. They want them tried 
in a Special Tribunal and in Kenyan courts. Only a small number – under 10 per cent – 
would like them to be forgiven. 
 
40. 4 per cent of respondents expected community members to attack people from other 
communities if their political leaders were held accountable. This suggests that there are still 
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pockets of people who can be mobilised for political violence in future.13 Once again, 
counties in the Rift Valley region have relatively fewer people who say they would support 
the trials because a significant population would hold demonstrate against such trials. Other 
counties have relatively more people who say they would support trials. Because of the threat 
this small group presents, people support a local mechanism to deal with low- and middle-
level perpetrators.  
 
41. The survey asked what people thought should be done to the rest of the suspected 
perpetrators. As many as 42 per cent suggested that middle and lower level perpetrators 
should be tried in Kenyan courts while 36 per cent wanted them tried by a special tribunal. 
Only 10 per cent of the respondents wanted them forgiven while 7 per cent thought the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission should handle the matter. 
Figure 13: What do you think should be done to the rest of the suspected perpetrators of post-election 
violence?14 
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41. These findings suggest widespread public support for ICC and the trial of those prosecuted. 
Although the population in Rift Valley is less inclined than everybody else to support the 
trial, it is not necessarily likely to engage in violence. In Rift Valley, 52 per cent of 
respondents said they would support the trials, 10 per cent would demonstrate against them, 
34 per cent would do nothing while only 3 per cent said they were likely to react violently 
against other communities.  
 
42. Public support for a local tribunal has remained high. The March 2011 survey shows that 77 
per cent of would like to see the rest of the perpetrators tried through a local mechanism. Of 
                                                 
13 Interviews in Londiani, Kericho County, 27 Dec 2010 
14 Only data for May 2010 and December 2010 included  
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these, 48 per cent prefer a Special Tribunal as recommended by the Commission on the Post 
Election Violence 9 (CIPEV) while 29 per cent would like them tried by existing local courts. 
These views resonate strongly with the government’s renewed commitment to reform the 
judiciary and the police, as articulated in its application for deferral at the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber.15  
Figure 14: What do you think should be done with the rest of the perpetrators? March 2011 
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The ICC and Political Alliances against Accountability  
43. The ICC Chief Prosecutor’s naming of suspects has aroused general anxiety among some 
politicians, who have resorted to politicising the investigation of the Kenya situation. From 
questioning at political rallies the objectivity of these investigations to alleging mischief 
intended to lock out some influential people from the 2012 presidential election, the 
discourses have sought to generate public anxiety about some ethnic exclusion in the 
country’s next political dispensation.16 To them, those named by the prosecutor are victims 
of political rivalry17 and that ‘the ICC is being used to eliminate political rivals for the 
presidential race.’18 There are also those who have raised concerns about three of the people 
named coming from one community in the Rift Valley, arguing that their community is 
being targeted. These discourses have reinforced a siege mentality among those in Rift 
Valley. Mention of the three suspects is consistent with local level discourses about one 
community being systematically targeted, isolated and excluded from the country’s power 
arrangements.19  
 
44. These discourses have shifted public focus and debate away from the criminal nature of the 
post-election violence to the politics of the presidential election. They have prevented public 
debate on how to address impunity and hold political leaders accountable. The political 
                                                 
15
 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Application on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute’ Public Document No. ICC-01/09-01/00 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 31 March 2011 
16 Interviews in Uasin Gishu, Kericho and Nairobi counties, 19 – 24 Dec 2010; also Githongo J, ‘Now that Ocampo has Dropped his 
Bombshell, We Must Watch our Step’ The East African, 20-26 Dec 2010, p. 19  
17Interview with a human rights activist in Uasin Gishu County, 20 Dec 2010; see also Hansard Report of the Prime Minister’s 
Statement, ‘Government Statement on the ICC Process’, 16 Dec 2010  
18 Interview with a community elder in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu County, 20 Dec 2010  
19 FGD with youth leaders in Uasin Gishu County, 12 Oct 2010; also Salim Lone, ‘Feeling of Isolation among Kalenjin Could again 
Divide Kenya’, Daily Nation, 6 Jan 2010 
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attention that the matter has received has meant little focus on how to foster accountability 
and secure justice for victims. 
 
45. While some allege their community is being targeted, others argue that they were the real 
victims of the post-election crisis and all they did was respond to the cries of distress from 
victims. These discourses have roused ethnic sympathies, which have in turn been whipped 
up to rationalise the formation of ethno-political alliances as a platform to wage their fight 
against prosecution and by extension, package their political ambitions. New ethno-regional 
alliances have formed especially comprising the main protagonists during the post-election 
violence in Rift Valley. Thus, the ICC action has inadvertently created opportunities for 
rapprochement between those who fought during the violence, in spite of the deep mistrust 
between them at the local level. But to some respondents, personal interests among these 
politicians are responsible for this; they are uniting against accountability and to perpetuate 
impunity:  ‘They are uniting now because they did not have their way.  If the list had ruined 
the political careers of their rivals, there would be no calls to repeal the International 
Crimes Act.’20 
 
46. These discourses have put the country in a premature election campaign mode and are 
constraining effective implementation of the New Constitution. The ethnic polarisation that 
is emerging due to resurgence of hate speech and emotive remarks at political rallies against 
the ICC and political rivals suggests that the country’s political leadership must not allow 
debate on fighting impunity to be overshadowed by political discourses.   
 
47. Political interests must not override the reform agenda or be allowed to mobilise violence 
ahead of 2012. They must not be allowed to obscure the urge for reforms. Although the 
voices of politicians are most audible, members of the public are supportive of prosecutions 
and would not like a repeat of 2007. Ordinary citizens are keen to see senior people and 
other suspects prosecuted. However, political supporters are likely to support a call to 
violence. In the March 2011 survey, 65 per cent think violence is unlikely to recur in 2012. 
However, 17 per cent violence may occur; and of 21 per cent of these believe supporters will 
cause violence if senior politicians are held accountable. 
Failure to investigate and prosecute 
48. There are concerns about failure to investigate and prosecute. Of all the crimes committed 
during the crisis period, only one person has been successfully prosecuted and convicted.21 
Suspects charged with the infamous arson attack on the Kiambaa church in Eldoret were 
acquitted in April 2009 for lack of evidence. A police officer caught on camera shooting 
protesters to death was also acquitted in June 2010 for want of proper investigation and 
prosecution. The fate of the cases that have gone to court, and the numerous others that 
have not, is a sufficient pointer to lack of political will and adequate capacity to conduct 
investigations to support successful prosecutions. The manner in which some of the 
country’s political leaders have reacted to and treated the ICC process has also added to the 
pessimism about political commitment to hold perpetrators accountable. One respondent in 
particular posed: ‘‘Has anything changed to make anyone think the country is now 
committed to stamping out impunity?’22 And one MP, while commenting about the 
                                                 
20 Interview with a Businessman in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu County, 17 Dec 2010 
21 The Standard, 16 December 2010 
22 Evans-Pritchard Blake, ‘Kenya’s tribunal pledges questioned’ Questioned’ Jan 2010 
22  
  
 
discussion to withdraw Kenya from the Rome Statute noted: ‘I am wondering about this 
sudden change of heart. Is it sincere? Why did it not come before Ocampo disclosed his list? 
.... This is not genuine; are we saying we are untouchable, we cannot even be 
investigated?’23’ 
 
49. The government’s application to the ICC challenging admissibility of the two cases cites the 
progress the country has made to restore public confidence in the judiciary and the police. 
The application notes that the enactment of the new constitution and the provisions on the 
Bill of Rights will ensure fair trials and procedural guarantees within the criminal justice 
system. It argues that national courts will now be capable of trying crimes from the post-
election violence, including the ICC cases without the need for legislation to create a special 
tribunal. It also outlines a six-month time-table for carrying out the reforms and trials.24   
 
50. This application notwithstanding, there is need to note that Parliament failed to establish a 
Special Tribunal. Many MPs supported trials at The Hague because they feared that the local 
judicial process would be interfered with. They only turned around to demand for a local 
mechanism once they knew who was on the list. Some of the political leaders also rejected 
the idea of a Special Tribunal arguing that the local judiciary was corrupt and beholden to 
special interests. These are clear signs that some of the political leaders would want to 
thwart the ICC process so as to evade accountability.  
 
51. Some Kenyans are generally sceptical about the sincerity of the government to fulfil its 
pledge to fight impunity because of the above contradictory positions by some leaders 
including some in government. Also this scepticism springs largely from the fact that there 
have been attempts to influence appointments to key institutions of governance. They are 
also sceptical that three years after the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Agreement, there has been little progress in prosecuting post-election violence cases, as 
Table 7 shows.  
                                                 
23 ‘Repeal of International Crimes Act’ The Hansard, 22 Dec 2010 
24 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Application on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute’ ICC Public Document No. ICC-01/0-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 31 March 2011 
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Table 7: Steps in the fight against impunity 
 
                31-Jan-11 Revive debate on Special Tribunal   
AU summit supports Kenya  
                
               11-Jan-10 The VP begins diplomatic efforts to 
support deferral  
              22-Dec-10 Parliament votes to repeal International 
Crimes Act (Rome Statute) 
             15-Dec-10 ICC names 6 suspects  
            May-10 ICC investigators arrive in Kenya  
           31-Mar-10 Authorization granted  
          26-Nov-09 ICC prosecutor seeks authorisation to investigate  
         14-Nov-09 No quorum for Special Tribunal Bill 
        30-Jul-09 2nd Bill rejected, vote for The Hague  
       14-Jul-09 Cabinet rejects Bill on special tribunal  
       8-Jul-09 
 
Kofi Annan hands 'secret envelope' to ICC and supporting 
materials 
   
       3-Jul-09 Kenyan Govt. committees to ICC to establish a local mechanism    
      12-Feb-09 Constitution of Kenya amendment Bill, 2009 on special tribunal defeated 
      27-Jan-09 Parliament adopts report     
     16-Dec-08 The Principals sign an agreement on implementation     
     4-Dec-08 Cabinet discusses CIPEV report      
    16-Oct-08 CIPEV submits report     
   22-May-08 President appoints CIPEV commissioners           
  4-Mar-08 Mediation team signs agreement to establish CIPEV        
Feb-08 National Accord signed, violence halted  
                       
52. The table also shows that the government failed to set up a Special Tribunal in spite of 
extension of agreed deadlines. A statute for the establishment of the Special Tribunal should 
have been enacted by 1 February 2009, after the Waki report was adopted by Parliament on 
27 January 2009. Notwithstanding the delay between the date set for a Special Tribunal and 
the adoption of the Waki report by Parliament, the Bill to establish the Tribunal was 
defeated in Parliament on 12 February 2009. Another time limit was set for August 2009. 
Again the government failed to set the Special Tribunal by this date. The government had 
also begun consultations with the ICC on the subject. Consequently, as required by CIPEV, 
the Panel handed to the ICC the sealed envelope containing the Commission’s 
recommendations for further investigations. Even after the matter had been handed over, 
Parliament again failed to pass the Bill for the Special Tribunal. 
Cooperating with ICC 
53. As mentioned above, the contradictory behaviour by MPs has led the public to question 
whether or not the Government will fully cooperate with the ICC. Cooperation with the ICC 
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has two elements. First, States are required to put in place domestic legislation that enables 
them to assist the court as and when requested. Secondly, States have a general obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and collection of evidence, arrest and surrender 
of suspects, extension of privileges and immunities to officers of the court, protection of 
victims and witnesses and the enforcement of ICC orders for fines and forfeiture. 25  
 
54. Until the recent efforts to withdraw Kenya from the Rome Statute and to defer the Kenya 
case, the Government had taken steps to cooperate with the ICC. In December 2008 Kenya 
enacted the International Crimes Act to domesticate the Rome Statute. In September 2010 
the Government signed the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International 
Criminal Court, which enabled ICC officials to conduct investigations in Kenya. 
 
55. Secondly, a Kenyan judge was appointed to support the investigations by being present as 
investigators took statements from senior security officials. Dialogue has been going on 
regarding the production of relevant official documents and the protection of witnesses and 
victims of the post-election violence. More cooperation would be expected in the event that 
the arrest or surrender of suspects is required. Cooperation is also expected in the event that 
there is a need for enforcement of orders, forfeiture of proceeds, seizure of property or assets 
that any accused person may have acquired as a result of the crime and in  case there is a 
need to give effect to awards of reparations to victims.26 Kenya is also obligated to extend its 
criminal laws to penalize offences against the court’s administration of justice and to submit 
cases of such offences to the prosecutor.  
 
56. The Government has all along pledged to cooperate with the ICC but recent developments 
suggest that full and effective cooperation may be constrained by differences between the 
two parties in the coalition. These signs include the demand by some MPs that Kenya 
withdraws from ICC. Related to this is also the quest to defer the Kenyan case, as well as the 
argument that a New Constitution provides an opportunity to reconstitute the judicial 
mechanisms in a manner that would enable the country to try the suspects. 
 
57. This argument attempts to sidestep the real reasons why the Waki Commission 
recommended establishing a Special Tribunal for Kenya or, in the alternative, passing the 
post-election violence cases to the ICC. The first was that investigations on PEV are weak 
and prosecutions half-hearted. The problems in Kenya’s judiciary are only part of the poor 
infrastructure that has nurtured impunity. Out of the hundreds of homicides committed 
during the post-election period, only a few headline cases have gone to court, and all of them 
been dismissed because the investigations were poor or insufficient and the prosecution 
unconvincing. Three years since the commission made its recommendations, no concrete 
action has been taken to effect its recommendations to overhaul the police service, set up an 
independent prosecutorial service, and bring those officers within its ranks who were 
responsible for specific crimes during the post-election violence to justice.  
 
58. It is important to also note that the Coalition Government lacks cohesion and presents 
different and opposed views on the ICC matter. Lack of cohesion within the coalition and the 
absence of a common position on the ICC will result in possibly one party of the Government 
                                                 
25 Jackson N Maogoto, “A Giant without Limbs: The International Criminal Court’s State-Centric Cooperation Regime”. University of 
New Castle, 2006 
26 Article 93 of the Rome Statute 
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seeking to cooperate and the other party opposing ICC investigations. The differences in the 
perceptions of the two parties have deepened internal party divisions. These divisions have 
widened further after failing to agree on whether or not to lobby the African Union to 
support Kenya’s quest for deferral of its case at the ICC through the United Nations Security 
Council. Given these developments, cooperation with the ICC is highly politicised, difficult to 
obtain and if obtained it is possible that the ICC will be subjected to political intricacies. 
 
59. Some Kenyans believe that prosecution or other measures to fight against impunity are 
crucial to preventing future violence. More people want action against suspected 
perpetrators because this will prevent future violence. A displaced person observed that ‘The 
ICC is the only option left to fight impunity in Kenya because the institutions and the 
politicians have failed. Ocampo cannot fail. He must not fail. If he does, that will be the end 
of Kenya because there will be nothing left to fear anymore.’27 
Figure 13: What would you say is the most important way to prevent future violence in Kenya? 
 
What would you say is the most important way to 
prevent future violence in Kenya?
 
 
60. Many Kenyans see the ICC investigation as an opportunity to fight impunity. It is not a 
threat to peace and security. Some Kenyans also want accountability over the post-election 
violence; they want justice through prosecutions. There is thus a clear disconnect between 
ordinary Kenyans and some politicians, particularly MPs. 
Illegally Armed Groups in the Society 
61. The KNDR agreement required illegally armed groups to be demobilised. The previous 
three review reports have shown that illegally armed groups are no longer conspicuous or 
visible as was the case in 2008 and 2009. Some transformed from informal agents of 
political violence to organised criminal gangs. The reports also noted that organised 
                                                 
27 Displaced person in Uasin Gishu, December 2010 
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criminal gangs had grown wealthy and powerful from extortion, kidnapping for ransom and 
collecting illegal taxes in urban informal settlements. It was found that in some parts of the 
country, they had taken over control of the transport industry, which they were running 
through extortion cartels. They were additionally found to have control of security in urban 
informal settlements, where they collect ‘protection fees’ from tenants, landlords and 
businesses.  
 
62. The visibility of these groups and their activities has reduced significantly. The absence of 
major overt political competitions that would have required these groups is responsible for 
their low visibility. Campaigns for the referendum would have provided this opportunity 
but parties in the Coalition Government were generally not opposed to each other. 
Secondly, the Government enacted the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act and proscribed 
33 groups. Within the framework of this law, the Government revived efforts to ‘crack 
down’ on suspected members of these groups, notably in Nairobi, Central and Rift Valley 
provinces. The Government has also been keen to secure watertight evidence against gangs 
for prosecution purposes and to protect witnesses who testify against them.28 
 
63. Many respondents across the counties do not cite awareness of the existence of such groups 
any more. However, the survey reveals that some groups still operate in Central, Nairobi, 
Coast and Nyanza regions. Interestingly, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ groups, they are all 
involved in ‘security’ activities, of which some community members are appreciative. 
 
64. Although these groups are not as active as they were in the past, the failure to prosecute 
leaders of older groups has led to those in place – including older groups -- becoming 
bolder in their operations. In Nairobi, Kirinyaga, Murang’a and Kisii counties, respondents 
revealed that ‘vigilantes’ comprise criminals yet work ‘in partnership’ with the police to 
‘fight crime’. In Mombasa, the Republican Council has challenged the declaration that it is 
an illegal group.29 Apparently, some members of the society tend to tolerate these groups 
because they fill a gap in the provision of security. This tolerance is gradually contributing 
to a culture that encourages unemployed youth to aspire to illicit behaviour. A growing 
number of unemployed youth tends to look at these activities as a source of income. Failure 
to act on these groups and to address youth unemployment therefore will lead to their 
becoming rooted at the local level in a manner that would make it difficult to reverse their 
growth. 
 
65. The national survey reveals that whereas Mungiki is the most known illegal group, with 
members in 25 counties, there is a large concentration of old and new illegal groups in 
Nairobi, Kisii, Kilifi and Mombasa counties. The groups emerge out of a need to address 
security concerns in a neighbourhood. However, in poor areas of Nairobi, such as in Kibera, 
they have been used to protect illegal tenants in houses whose owners were displaced 
during the post-election violence. The groups are so organised that in some poor areas of 
Nairobi, the police find it difficult to conduct operations: ‘A police man cannot just walk 
into these places alone; they come in a group. And even then, the group of police officers 
needs protection from the residents.’30  
                                                 
28 Interview with a senior government official, 29 Oct 2010; also ‘Security Chiefs Plot War against Gangs under New Law’, Daily 
Nation,  6 Oct 2010 
29 Interviews in Mombasa with members of the group, 15-18 Dec 2010; also ‘Mombasa Republican Council to Sue the State’, The 
Star, 3 Jan 2010 
30 Interview with a Community Policing member in Kibera, 29 Dec 2010 
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66. The following are the most common groups mentioned in the 47 counties: 
Table 8: Illegal groups31 
If yes, name the most common groups 
Name County where respondents knew members  
Mungiki Kirinyaga, Murang’a, Nyandarua, Nyeri, Kiambu, Kilifi, Tana River, Embu, Machakos, 
Isiolo, Tharaka, Nairobi, Mandera, Homa Bay, Kisumu, Migori, Kisii, Kajiado, Narok, 
Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Laikipia, Busia, Bungoma 
Sungu Sungu Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale, Homa Bay, Migori, Kisii, Nyamira, Trans Nzoia, Turkana 
Taliban Mombasa, Nairobi, Homa Bay, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru 
Pamba 40 Kisii, Nairobi 
Flying Squad Kisii, Nairobi 
Sabaot Land Defence Force Trans Nzoia, Vihiga, Bungoma 
Kamjesh Nairobi 
Jambazi Nyamira, Bungoma 
Somali Vigilante Nairobi, Turkana 
40 Brothers Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale, Vihiga 
Community Policing Mombasa, Kisumu, Siaya, Nyamira 
Congo by Force Mombasa 
Omaris Nairobi 
Baghdad Boys Kilifi, Garissa, Mandera, Nairobi 
The Al-Shabaab Militia Kilifi, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera 
 
67. Focus groups and interviews in Kibera identified other  groups such as 12 Disciples, 14 
Flamingoes, Yes We Can, Siafu, Gendarmes, Bunker, Tuffgong, Gogo Boys, Labour, 
Kamukunji Pressure Group, Force 10 and Olympic Youth. Others include The Rebels, Base 
10, Al Aqsa, Rutanga, and Bunchers.  
 
68. A similar trend has been observed in other informal settlements in the east of Nairobi. The 
new groups are said to form as a result of internal disagreements in existing groups, 
particularly over sharing money or other spoils of crime.  
 
69. People have little confidence in these groups. Compared to 2008 immediately after the 
violence, there are many people who now prefer protection by the police than by these 
groups. It was also observed that although these groups demand protection fees, the people 
pay because the police also ask for money to buy fuel for their vehicles or mobile phone 
airtime to call their superiors. Some even argue that illegal groups while not acceptable to 
society, have some advantages over the police. For example, they mete out ‘instant justice’ 
and are available at all times. They also ‘arrange’ for access to water, services, and negotiate 
for employment or other opportunities.  
                                                 
31 See names of other groups in May 2009 and March 2010 review reports 
28  
  
 
 
  Table 9: Police versus local armed groups: Which is closest to your own view? 
 
 
70. Asked what should be done to shut down the operations of these groups, 58 per cent of 
Kenyans said that banning them and arresting their members would suffice. A worrying 10 
per cent of the respondents supported extra-judicial executions, suggesting the 
despondency the public feel have with regard to illegal groups as a threat to society. 
Figure 14: What should be done to these groups so that they cease operating? 
 
 
71. Illegal groups thrive because of impunity, political support and structural factors such as 
poverty and unemployment. Efforts to eradicate them must, therefore, focus on these 
structural factors through implementation of Agenda 4 reforms, including ending the 
culture of impunity. Special operations and ‘crackdowns’ have not been effective in dealing 
with illegal groups. An assessment of Mt Elgon area by the Kenya Red Cross society in 
November 2010 found that remnants of the Sabaot Land Defence Force, ostensibly crushed 
Which of the following is closest to your own view? 
It is more important for local armed groups to protect their communities than 
the police 
5% 
It is more important for the police to protect communities than local armed 
groups 
74% 
It is more important for both the police and local armed groups to protect 
communities 
20% 
DK 1% 
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through a joint police-military operation (Operation Okoa Maisha) in March 2008 have 
began to reorganise and to terrorise citizens.32  
Conclusion 
72. The ICC investigation of the Kenya situation has reached a critical point. However, some 
political leaders have a common interest in thwarting the work of the ICC Chief Prosecutor 
because indictment would negatively impact on political careers. They are collectively 
contributing to the formation of ethno-regional alliances that would shield them from the 
ICC process as well as promote their political interests. Some leaders in these new alliances 
have an interest in opposing accountability, particularly if measures to do so undermine 
their quest for national political power. These new dynamics imply that the ICC is likely to 
face difficulties in obtaining full and effective cooperation from the political parties in the 
coalition. Self interest rather than national good tends to be the driving force in attempts to 
thwart the ICC process. 
 
73. Kenyans are supportive of the ICC and want to see senior people prosecuted and held 
accountable for their role in the post-election violence. They want change. Politicians are 
nonetheless unified in their efforts to oppose measures that run contrary to their quest to 
consolidate power. They want the status quo to remain, and to sustain the old order. These 
efforts show a major fault line between the aspirations of ordinary Kenyans and some 
political leaders. There is need for the Government to support the people’s desires in order 
to begin creating a new beginning. 
 
74. During this review period, there has been no known report of politicians activating any 
illegal group for political purposes, such as organising violence. However, as the ICC 
investigations get under way, and political strategies begin to be laid in preparation for the 
2012 General Election, it is highly likely that such overtures could re-emerge. As noted 
above, a culture that admires wealth from illicit activities will encourage more candidates 
from the ranks of criminal organisations and gangs to seek political office. The likelihood of 
using resources acquired from criminal activities to support violent campaign strategies is 
not remote; it presents a real threat to peace and stability during the election year.  
  
                                                 
32 OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update Vol. 66, 15 Nov - 15 Dec 2010, p. 3. 
30  
  
 
3.  RESETTLEMENT OF IDPS AND RECONCILIATION AMONG COMMUNITIES 
 
Introduction 
75.  The KNDR agreement required the two parties to address the humanitarian crisis and 
promote healing and reconciliation. The two parties were required to resettle Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and address the problems that IDPs faced. The previous review 
reports have tracked progress in resettlement efforts and the challenges therein. The 
findings generally suggested that the Government’s Operation Rudi Nyumbani enabled 
many IDPs to return to their farms and to reconstruct their lives and livelihoods.  
 
76. This review again examines progress and challenges experienced in resettlement and 
reconciliation among communities. It is noted here that allegations of corruption in the 
resettlement programme, lack of social cohesion in return areas, landlessness and hate 
speech over Mau Forest evictions and politicisation of the IDP problem generally combined 
to create unsafe conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs.  
Resettlement of IDPs 
77. The presence of IDPs in ‘transit camps’ continues to attract political attention and to raise 
concern among the public. Many are concerned that the Government disbursed funds for 
resettlement, reconstruction of houses and purchase of land, yet the IDP problems are still 
far from over.33  In the past three years, the Government reported spending Ksh7.977 
billion to support IDPs.34  
Table 10: Government disbursement in support of IDPs 
Financial 
Year 
2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 
Amount 
(Ksh) 
1.25 billion 1.035 billion 3.005 billion 2.687 billion 
 
78. In spite of this support and interventions to assist the IDPs, the number of displaced persons 
in transit camps does not seem to have been reduced. This limited impact is attributable to 
several factors. These include corruption in the resettlement programme involving especially 
some Government officials and some IDP leaders. Some people were arrested and charged in 
court but the cases are yet to be concluded.35  
 
79. Secondly, the IDPs problem has been politicised by leaders from the areas where people 
were displaced, as well as those who share an ethnic identity with the IDPs. IDPs have 
become a source of political capital for some politicians. The May 2010 review report showed 
that some politicians were making promises of land and scholarships to some IDPs to 
influence them against giving incriminating evidence in investigations into the post-election 
                                                 
33 Interview with an official from the Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 31 Jan 2010, who said plans were under way to 
construct houses for those in Ya Mumbi camp and then close it   
34‘Statement on Government Support for IDPs’, Press statement from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of 
Finance, The Star, 7 January, 2011  
35 Interview with an official at the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP), 31 Jan 2011; also ‘State Admits to Presence of 
Fraudsters in IDP Camps’, The Standard, 25 Jan 2010; ‘Imposters, Corrupt Officials Cash in on Displaced Persons’ Plight’, The 
Standard, 26 Jan 2010  
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violence. Other leaders have raised funds publicly on behalf of displaced persons, claiming 
that the Government had neglected them.  
 
80. Politicisation of the IDPs problem continues to recur regularly.  Some politicians are 
mobilising their ethnic communities to prevent the resettlement of IDPs in what they 
consider their ancestral territory. They reject IDPs using the argument that the latter should 
be returned to their ancestral districts since there are landless people among ‘indigenous’ 
communities who would like to be settled, too. Ethnicisation of resettlement efforts implies 
continued problems for IDPs. These sentiments and ethnic claims to land are slowly 
deepening the IDPs crisis. The IDPs problem is increasingly instrumentalised to assist in 
political competition. 
 
81. These factors have undermined the potential impact of the IDP resettlement programme. 
But there are a number of initiatives under way that are likely to improve on this and offer a 
sustainable solution. Important among these is the Bill of Rights in the New Constitution. If 
effectively enforced, it could guarantee protection of lives and property for people in any part 
of the country.  
 
82. Second is the draft National Policy on Internal Displacement. The Protection Working 
Group on Internal Displacement, comprising officials from the Government, human rights 
and humanitarian organisations, is aligning the policy with the New Constitution to facilitate 
its adoption and implementation.36 The Ministry of Special Programmes said it hoped to 
finalise resettlement by the end of December 2011.  
 
83. Finally, there is a ‘Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs’. 37 The 
committee will look into how the Government has addressed the plight of current IDPs in 
terms of basic food rations, shelter and compensation. It will also review existing institutions 
and organs for addressing forced displacements, examine policies and laws governing all 
forms of forced displacement with the aim of promoting protection and improving the well-
being of forced migrants. The committee, whose mandate ends in May 2011, will make 
recommendations on how to effectively address the IDP problem. .   
 
84. These policy initiatives do not, however, reflect the complex dynamics of the IDPs crisis. A 
complex land problem, entrenched ethnic mistrust and failed peace-building efforts have 
made it difficult for IDPs to return in a sustainable manner. These are the challenges to be 
tackled to enable IDPs to find durable solutions. These challenges are also anchored on the 
broader democratic governance agenda and, therefore, interlinked with reforms in the 
broader socio-political context. Thus only by undertaking reforms to stabilize the national 
political context will the IDP problem be fully settled. 
 
85. In the meantime, it is now well recognised that part of the solution to the IDPs problem is to 
resettle some of them elsewhere. Over a quarter of respondents in successive surveys say 
that resettling IDPs elsewhere is one important step the Government can take to address the 
problem. A significant number also underline the need to resettle IDPs where they were 
displaced from and give them land. While these are important strategies for addressing the 
IDPs problem, they must be anchored on broader democratic governance reforms for better 
                                                 
36 OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update Vol. 66, p. 2 
37 ‘Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs’ The Hansard,  3 Nov 2010 
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impact. 
Table 11: Best ways to resolve the IDPs crisis 
What is the most important thing the Government can do to address the problem of IDPs in Kenya? 
 Aug-09 Feb-10 Nov-10 
Resettle them elsewhere 33% 34% 28% 
Resettle them in areas where they were displaced from 25% 18% 24% 
Give them financial assistance 12% 13% 28% 
Promote peace and reconciliation 12% 12% 10% 
Take them back to their ancestral districts 7% 12% 6% 
Increase security 6% 9% 6% 
Give them land   35% 
Resettle them where they are 11% 
DK 3% 1%  
Other 2% 1% 1% 
Shelter Reconstruction 
86. The Government, development partners and humanitarian organisations have put 
significant efforts into reconciling communities through peace meetings, training 
workshops, counselling, sports and games, agriculture and livelihoods recovery programmes 
as well as shelter reconstruction. Over 20,000 houses have been constructed by the 
Government and humanitarian agencies with support from the African Development Bank 
(ADB), the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN CERF) and development 
partners. Other agencies that have supported IDPs shelter reconstruction include Habitat for 
Humanity, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Goal Ireland, Kenya Red Cross 
Society, Danish Refugee Council and the Catholic Church.  Many others have supported 
livelihoods recovery programmes such as provision of seed, fertilisers and other farm inputs. 
 
87. IOM has been involved in the reconstruction programme since 2008. The organisation has 
constructed over 11,000 houses for IDPs in various parts of Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, and 
Molo, among others. Table 12 tracks the progress IOM reconstruction efforts have yielded in 
the area. 
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Table 12: IOM shelter reconstruction programme 
Area of 
operation 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Totals 
constructed 
Funding 
source Totals 
Funding 
source Totals 
Funding 
source Totals 
Funding 
Source Totals 
Molo District 
UN Central 
Emergency 
Response 
Fund  
 
(UN CERF) 
  
 
210 
GOVT 
of 
JAPAN 
0 
ADB/MoSSP 
0 
African 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
and 
MOSSP 
(ADB/MoSSP)  
0 210 
lugari District 200 1540 0 0 1740 
Wareng 
District 50 1457 1790 1784 5081 
Eldoret East 
district 240 480 478 1396 2594 
Eldoret West 
district 0 659 0 0 659 
T.East District 0 2131 0 0 2131 
T.west District 0 2206 0 0 2206 
GRAND 
TOTALS   700   8473   2268   3180 14621 
Source: IOM Eldoret Sub-Office, March 2011 
 
88. Despite efforts to support shelter reconstruction, some IDPs have not been able to occupy 
their reconstructed homes. For instance, in Kamuyu and Lorien, some IDPs have not 
occupied their newly constructed houses. Some of those interviewed cite ethnic tension and 
sporadic attacks.  However, insecurity or fear is not the only problem. Some respondents 
suggested that IDPs have houses elsewhere. There are also claims that some IDPs only 
wanted to be allocated land because they were landless. Yet others claim not to have 
furniture and other personal goods. This kind of reasoning betrays the dependency 
syndrome that has characterised the lives of many IDPs, who have got used to receiving 
handouts. It is this category of the displaced that many accuse of refusing to reconstruct 
their lives because they ‘benefit’ from claiming to be IDPs. Nonetheless, the IDP problem is 
continuing to become a complex issue that requires both administrative and policy 
solutions; it should be attended to urgently. 
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Reconciliation among Communities 
89. Respondents in areas where IDPs have settled note that their relationship is good and they 
are relating with IDPs well. Indeed, attacks against IDPs are few and isolated. Asked how 
people related to the IDPs who lived in their areas (if any), 84 per cent said they related with 
the respondents very well. Only a small proportion (5%) said they related badly, while 4 per 
cent said they had a strained relationship. These observations point to improving relations at 
the local level.  
Figure 15: If there are IDPs in your area, how would you describe the relationship between IDPs 
and the people of this area? 
Very 
good/good
Strained 
very bad/bad
Don't know
84%
4%
7%
4%
If yes, how would you describe the relationship between IDPs 
and people of this area?
 
 
90. Reconciliation among Kenyan communities is taking place, though gradually. There are 
many people who feel that reconciliation is taking place but the responses do not suggest 
that a lot has been achieved in this respect. In December 2010, only about 23 per cent said 
that a lot of reconciliation had taken place. This is a drop from 33 per cent of the responses 
obtained in the March 2009 survey. 
Figure 16: How much would you say communities have reconciled? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
A lot
Just a little
Not at all
Don't know
33%
58%
6%
3%
18%
59%
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Thinking about reconciliation among Kenyan communities after the 
post-election violence, how much would you say communities have 
reconciled?
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91. Across the country, Rift Valley has slightly more people (24 per cent) who feel that a lot of 
reconciliation has taken place. Few people feel that reconciliation has not taken place at all. 
Table 13: How much would you say communities have reconciled? (by region) 
  CENTRAL COAST NAIROBI NYANZA RIFT VALLEY WESTERN 
  A lot 25% 13% 13% 23% 24% 20% 
 Just a little 58% 67% 77% 69% 68% 72% 
 Not at all 11% 13% 8% 6% 5% 5% 
 DK 4% 7% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
 RTA 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
 
92. Most Kenyans have a strong sense of citizenship and express a high level of national 
cohesion. Over 80 per cent have no problems relating with members of other communities, 
and they would readily work and invest in regions settled by people from other tribes. 
However, respondents expressed hesitation about the likelihood of building a house, buying 
land or settling in an area dominated by members of another tribe.  
Table 14: How likely or unlikely are you to co-exist with other tribes 
How likely / unlikely are you able to do the following in an area where members of another community 
live? (Those who said ‘very/somewhat likely’) 
Buy land  70% 
Set up a business  78% 
Settle there  70% 
Send your children to school 81% 
Get employment  84% 
Build a house  64% 
   
 
93. Many people recognise that ethnicity and political utterances are a major challenge to peace 
and reconciliation efforts in the country. Matters such as access to land, which are 
sometimes cited as the cause of conflicts between communities, are not identified as major 
challenges. This implies that democratic governance reforms are central to consolidating 
peace and reconciliation efforts. Promoting reconciliation and unity in Kenya cannot, 
therefore, be divorced from the fight against all forms of impunity and measures to entrench 
political accountability, as well as delivering on all necessary reforms.  
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Table 15: What is the most important challenge to peace and reconciliation efforts in your area? 
What is the most important challenge to peace and reconciliation in your area? 
Tribalism  27% 
Political utterances  25% 
Mistrust between ethnic groups 16% 
Land disputes  9% 
People who committed crimes are still free  8% 
Lack of involvement by community members  6% 
No response 6% 
People are too  hurt and traumatised 2% 
Poverty  1% 
Conclusions 
94. The Government has provided resources to address the problems that IDPs face. It has 
assisted some IDPs to buy land, and disbursed funds for start-up and reconstruction of 
homes. In spite of these efforts, the problems facing the IDPs are far from over because they 
are anchored on the broader socio-political context. Although resettlement is an important 
intervention, sustainable solutions cannot be divorced from broader democratic governance 
reforms. 
 
95. The IDPs problem is increasingly politicised. IDPs have been used to advance the political 
objectives of some leaders. Some politicians have opposed the resettlement of IDPs on land 
perceived to be the preserve of their ethnic communities. This has not only ethnicised the 
IDPs problem, but also created new dilemmas in the search for durable solutions. However, 
provisions in the New Constitution, if enforced, present new opportunities for the protection 
of the lives and property of IDPs in any county in Kenya.  
 
96. Different leaders have conflicting political interests on the IDPs question. This undermines 
the search for a durable solution. Those from the areas where the Government intends to 
settle IDPs are opposed to resettlement because their own constituents demand that that 
their landlessness problems be addressed. Those from the same ethnic community as the 
IDPs are also keen to see the unconditional resettlement of the displaced.   
 
97. The IDPs problem appears to be the result of failure to deepen democratic governance. Only 
by correcting the practice of politics and use of political power for national good will this 
problem be resolved in a sustainable manner.  
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4.  THE ICC AND COHESION IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT 
 
Introduction 
98. The KNDR agreement recognised that the post-election crisis revolved around issues of 
power and the functioning of state institutions.38 The two parties agreed to share power and 
to establish a Coalition Government to allow for undertaking of fundamental reforms. The 
Constitution was amended to provide for the coalition in this respect. 
99. Power sharing under the National Accord was not an end in itself but a means for achieving 
reforms that would prevent future violence. It was ‘not about creating positions that reward 
individuals’39. It was about ‘enabling leaders to look beyond partisan considerations with a 
view to promoting the greater interests of the nation as whole’. The Agreement on the 
Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government noted that the two parties were 
setting the country forward on a new path. They committed themselves ‘to work together as 
true partners, through constant consultations and willingness to compromise’. The 
agreement required the new Government to pass and implement fundamental reforms, 
including concluding a review of the constitution, to prevent future violence.  
100. This section of the report examines coherence within the Coalition Government, how critical 
reforms have been undertaken and the manner in which these reforms compromise unity 
within the coalition. The issue of how the ICC process is affecting cohesion within the 
Government is also addressed. 
Key Findings  
Summary of findings 
• Power sharing conflicts continue to inform relations between the parties 
• Most Kenyans think power sharing has benefitted the country 
• Public satisfied with the working relationship between the President and 
Prime Minister 
• Political interests and lack of Government cohesion slow down the 
implementation of the constitution 
• Political Parties Disputes Tribunal formed to arbitrate inter- and intra- 
party wrangles 
 
The Kenya Grand Coalition Government: Hiccups from the Start  
101. Political parties get into power sharing arrangements when it is realised that no individual 
party can govern without the other. But for power sharing to work, political elites have to 
accommodate each other’s views, transcend ethnic and party differences, and compromise to 
create a unity of purpose. These initiatives are critical for the purpose of implementing 
policies and enhancing the stability of the country. Failure to compromise and transcend 
parochial differences usually weakens not only the coalitions, but also threatens the stability 
of the society. To promote cohesion, political elites in power are usually required to commit 
themselves to the spirit of dialogue and consultations, as well as the pursuit of the national 
                                                 
38 Agenda Item 3: How to resolve the political crisis, from the annotated agenda prepared by Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation team 
39Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, available at www.dialoguekenya.org. 
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interest.  
102. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which established the Coalition Government, 
clearly underlined the importance of these principles. The National Accord established a 
framework that sought to promote the interests of the nation rather than narrow political 
ones. Its goal was to achieve sustainable peace, stability and justice through the rule of law 
and respect for human rights. 
103. Kenya’s Coalition Government has had little cohesion from inception. Political factionalism 
and divisions within the main parties have posed the greatest hurdles to consolidation of a 
unity of purpose. Divisions along ethno-political lines continue to weaken the Government. 
Personal political and ethnic interests have increasingly undermined unity. Indeed, rarely 
does national or public interest override these narrow interests. In the recent past, and since 
the ICC process entered high gear, the partner parties in the Coalition Government have had 
difficulties forging a common position on how to undertake essential reforms. 
104. But it is not the ICC process alone that is undermining unity in Government. The failure to 
recognise that the Grand Coalition was not an end in itself but a means to undertaking far-
reaching reforms has seen the Government mired in endless conflicts. Additionally, the 
failure to adhere to the principles outlined in the National Accord has deepened these 
conflicts. Several factors stand out in this context. One is rewarding individuals rather than 
looking beyond partisan considerations so as to promote national interests. This underlies 
the nature of conflicts within the coalition because there aren’t enough resources to satisfy 
everyone. Furthermore, each party would prefer to have more to reward its followers. 
Second is the absence of a framework to resolve disputes. Thirdly, and finally, is the low level 
of trust among political elites. The need to promote self interest contributes to mistrust and 
suspicion. These factors have generally combined to intensify internal incoherence within 
Government. 
105. Most of the challenges facing the coalition have their origins in how individual elites in the 
Government perceived power sharing. The parties went into power sharing arrangements as 
different entities with varied agendas. While initial disputes centred on the meaning of ‘real 
power sharing’ and how this would be operationalised, the instrumentalisation of power 
sharing has perpetuated these early divisions. Political elites interpreted power sharing from 
a point that gave them advantage rather than from a national interest point of view. Thus, 
from the start, the Coalition Government faced challenges of cohesion.  
106. The first divisions occurred over the composition of the Cabinet and how to share power. 
The two principals nonetheless transcended their party divisions and formed a new Cabinet 
based on the principal of 50-50 portfolio balance. Formation of the coalition Cabinet did not 
end the initial differences and suspicions. Disputes emerged over which partner would 
control which ministry. ODM was getting into power sharing when PNU had already 
appointed Cabinet ministers before the mediation process had officially began. This certainly 
constrained the consultations over which party would get what ministries. PNU allegedly did 
not want to share power beyond cabinet positions, while ODM wanted senior public sector 
positions included. 
107. The next conflict was on protocol and government hierarchy. Again, self-serving interests 
informed interpretations on the hierarchy of power. Some argued that the Vice President 
was second in hierarchy and that the Head of Civil Service had duties similar to those of the 
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Prime Minister. This saw multiple interpretations of the duties of the two offices, according 
to party lines, thus increasing suspicions and mistrust.   
108. The import of these challenges is that they created within the public psyche an image of ‘two-
governments-in-one.’ In the surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009, the public generally 
viewed the Government as comprising two factions, with one of having more power than the 
other. In 2008, 49 per cent of respondents said power was not shared equally between PNU 
and ODM. This increased to 58 per cent in August 2009.40 Lack of consensus over key 
decisions and having different and opposed positions on major issues gave credence to this 
view.  
109. These conflicts keep recurring. The problem of power sharing has remained constant. In 
addition, the two parties have not formed an effective conflict resolution mechanism that 
could guide how to resolve the main sticking points. A coalition agreement that had been 
drafted in 2008 after the signing of the National Accord was not signed. The closest the 
parties have come to establishing such a mechanism is the setting up of the Permanent 
Committee on the Management of the Affairs of the Coalition, which was stillborn and 
ineffective, rarely meets and is yet to be effectively used. 
 
110. These difficulties have impacted on people’s confidence in the Coalition Government. Asked 
whether power sharing is anything they would like to see after another election, 75 per cent 
of respondents answered in the negative, while 21 per cent said they would not mind it. 
Figure 17:  Is power sharing between parties in government something you would like to see after another 
election? 
 
Is power sharing between political parties in 
government something you would like to see after 
another election?
 
 
111. When asked about what they perceived as the main failures of the Coalition Government, 41 
per cent of respondents cited the failure to fight corruption while another 38 per cent said it 
was lack of political cohesion or unity within the coalition. It is significant that people pay 
                                                 
40 See South Consulting reports, January 2009;  at www.dialoguekenya.org 
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attention to key governance issues rather than development ones, in judging the success of 
the Government. This is an important point to bear in mind – that governance is critical to 
how people perceive the Government. In fact, the legitimacy of the Government is based not 
only on the extent to which it delivers development, but also the extent to which it 
undertakes democratic governance reforms. Thus, the fight against corruption, tribalism, 
and political disunity appear as the main factors that people are unhappy about. 
 
Figure 18:  What are the main failures of the Coalition Government? 
Lack of fighting corruption
Poor infrastructure
Insecurity
Tribalism
Political disunity
Failure to resettle IDPs
Failure to create employment
Failure to fight poverty
Failure to deliver social services
NR
41%
23%
22%
22%
38%
26%
4%
2%
1%
2%
What would you say are the main failures of the Coalition 
Government?
 
 
112. Yet, Kenyans are not necessarily dismissive of the current power sharing arrangement. There 
are many people who see the current power sharing arrangement as beneficial because it 
pulled the country out of a crisis that threatened the future of Kenya. When asked how 
power sharing has helped the country, 47 per cent said the enactment of a New Constitution 
is the greatest benefit of the power sharing government. Another 45 per cent said it has 
brought peace and stability, while 27 per cent cited improved ethnic relations. 
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Table 16: In what ways, if any, has power sharing benefitted the country? 
In what ways, if any, has power-sharing benefitted the 
country? (multiple responses)
Brought new constitution 47%
Brought peace and stability 45%
Improved ethnic relations 27%
Improved economic  development 16%
Helped in fighting corruption 15%
Nothing 12%
Others 3%
 
113. Many people are also satisfied with the Coalition Government in respect of promoting media 
freedom, implementing the Constitution, and promoting reconciliation among communities. 
They are dissatisfied about how the Government has addressed youth unemployment and 
how it is resettling the IDPs. These are the main issues that constituted the agreement on 
Agenda 4 of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Agreement. They 
require urgent attention. 
Figure 19: Thinking about the Coalition Government, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with its 
performance in the following areas? 
 
Thinking about the Coalition Government, how satisfied 
or dissatisfied are you with its performance in the 
following areas…
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114. Close to half of the population in the counties most affected by violence acknowledge that 
the Government has restored peace: 66 per cent of respondents in Trans Nzoia, 44 per cent 
in Uasin Gishu, 43 per cent in Nakuru, and 46 per cent in Nandi counties, which were all 
affected by the PEV, say the Government has restored peace and stability. Table 18 provides 
an overview of responses in these counties. The new constitution and peace and stability are 
identified generally as the main achievements. 
Table 17: In what ways, if any, has power sharing benefitted the country? (Selected counties) 
  Kisumu Kisii Kiambu Kericho Nandi Trans 
Nzoia 
Turkana Uasin 
Gishu 
Nakur
u 
Momb
asa 
Improved ethnic 
relations 
26% 21% 18% 18% 19% 31% 36% 30% 36% 20% 
Brought new 
constitution 
58% 62% 54% 37% 50% 24% 68% 45% 47% 39% 
Brought peace 
and stability 
57% 34% 41% 39% 46% 62% 47% 44% 43% 40% 
Helped in fighting 
corruption 
11% 29% 27% 15% 8% 13% 22% 10% 29% 18% 
Improved 
economic  
development 
23% 13% 14% 19% 15% 21% 9% 19% 21% 16% 
Others 8% 8% 3% 2% 0% 1% 0% 3% 2% 6% 
Nothing 7% 10% 5% 22% 14% 15% 2% 14% 6% 18% 
 
115. To many Kenyans, power sharing is still relevant three years after the signing of the National 
Accord. As many as 74 per cent of the respondents noted that the power sharing agreement 
between PNU and ODM is still relevant since the coalition is expected to implement the new 
laws. Further to some respondents, the coalition ‘is the only government we have now to 
ensure future stability by implementing the New Constitution.’41 
                                                 
41 Interview with a teacher from Kiambu County, 29 January 2011 
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Figure 20: How relevant is power sharing between PNU and ODM today? 
 
How relevant is power-sharing between PNU and ODM 
today?
 
 
116. As many as 86% of Kenyans would prefer the Coalition Government to remain in office until 
2012. They want the coalition to facilitate the implementation of the New Constitution by 
remaining in office instead of conducting new elections.  
 
Figure 21:  Do you prefer that the Coalition Government continues until 2012, or do you prefer that the 
country holds a General Election before 2012? 
 
Do you prefer that the coalition government continues 
until 2012, or do you prefer that the country holds 
general elections before 2012?
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117. Although people would like the coalition to remain in power to implement reforms, the 
manner in which these reforms are implemented is impacting on unity within the 
Government and especially between the two parties. It is also weakening the main parties. 
Over half of the population generally feel that the Government is having a hard time working 
in unison to implement the Constitution. This was a 7% increase from December 2010 and 
reflects the escalated divisions within the coalition. 
Figure 22: In your opinion, does the Coalition Government have an easy or hard time 
working together in the Constitution implementation process? (March 2011) 
0%
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In your opinion, is it easy or hard for the grand coalition government working 
together?  (March 2011)
Easy
Hard
Don't Know / Not sure
No response
 
 
118. People are clear that disunity within the coalition is preventing key reforms. It is making it 
hard for the Government to implement the New Constitution. 
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Figure 23: What is the most important reason why it is hard for the Coalition Government to 
work together? (March 2011) 
 
119. Lack of cohesion within the Government and political party divisions continue to entrench 
the public perception of divisions within it. Even on matters relating to major reforms, the 
image of ‘two-governments-in-one,’ is reinforced because there are always likely to be ‘two 
different voices’ or even ‘two versions of the story’ on each issue. This is attested by how the 
two partners in government continue to react to the ICC process, tackling corruption, and 
even to the appointments under the New Constitution. 
120. From December 2010 when the ICC Chief Prosecutor identified six people for prosecution, 
the two partners in Government have issued contradictory and opposing views on the 
position of the Government. While those in PNU and their new allies in ODM argued for 
deferral of the Kenyan case and even lobbied the African Union and United Nations Security 
Council to assist in attaining this goal, ODM refused to support the initiative, arguing that 
the Cabinet did not resolve to do so and dismissed the effort as a partisan and personal 
agenda. The government has also challenged the admissibility of the six ICC cases but ODM 
said it is not party to these efforts. This has continued to portray the government as ‘two-
governments-in-one’. 
121. The ICC prosecutions have further split ODM with the party MPs sharply divided on what 
support to offer their colleagues who were named by the ICC. This has witnessed the party 
leaders and members giving contradictory statements on the party position. These disputes 
and politicization of the ICC process has led to slow implementation of the new constitution 
with energies being diverted to strategising and formation of political alliances on the ICC 
process. The ethnic mobilisation taking place in these rallies is similar to what accompanied 
the companies for the 2007 elections and the violence thereafter.  
122. Making appointments under the New Constitution have polarised the government even 
further because the framework on which the two parties can agree on these appointments is 
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fairly weak. Specifically, on 28 January 2011, the President announced names of nominees to 
the offices of the Attorney General, Chief Justice, Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Director of Budget, saying he had consulted with the Prime Minister. However, the Prime 
Minister argued that full consultations and consensus had not taken place and, therefore, 
the nominees had not been agreed upon.  
123. While the President later rescinded the appointments and asked the JSC and Public Service 
Commission to assist in filling the positions, political debate over the appointments had 
already deeply polarised the elite along party and ethnic lines. It also led to discussions on 
relevance of the Coalition Government with some politicians calling for the dissolution of 
parliament and holding of elections. Polarisation resulting from these disputes has rapidly 
shifted the focus of the debate away from reforms to consolidation of political power and 
even of ethnic interests.  
124. The issue of ‘real power sharing’ and how it should be implemented continues to antagonise 
relations between the two parties in a manner that affects how reforms are carried out.42 The 
old debate about the powers of both the President and the Prime Minister under the 
National Accord has resurfaced in the implementation of key reforms. Some of those in PNU 
still argue that the two Principals are not legally equal and that the President has the final 
word on key decisions.43 In addition, they argue that the requirement for consultations does 
not imply consensus, something they say is difficult to achieve. However, ODM argues that 
the spirit of the National Accord, as well as the transitional clauses in the Constitution state 
that the Prime Minister and President should consult and agree on key decisions.44 They 
argue that the spirit of the New Constitution is far more critical and ought to be respected.  
125. These conflicts have once again brought to the fore the need to form active conflict 
mediation organs within the coalition to facilitate consultations and consensus building. The 
coalition partners will, most of the time, have differences on matters of policy and tactics. 
That is why the National Accord set out the principles of partnership in the coalition and 
identified consultations and willingness to compromise as important for the stability of the 
Government. The constitution further provided for consultations between the two principals 
on major decisions to promote national harmony and avoid unnecessary friction.  
126. Parliament reacted to the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s action of naming six people as suspects by 
introducing and debating a motion seeking to make Kenya pull out of the Rome Statute. Yet, 
the Government ratified the treaty in 2005 and domesticated it in December 2008 by 
enacting the International Crimes Act 2008. The parliamentary debate was stormy. Political 
passions that had been evident in the aftermath of the PEV returned, raising tensions in the 
country.  In the heat of the moment the language of ‘our people are targeted’ resurfaced and 
obscured the notion that it was individual accountability being sought over the post-election 
violence and not communities. These sentiments will continue to ethnicise the reform 
agenda, even though the New Constitution seeks to move people away from ethnic to civic 
based politics. 
127. MPs passed the motion urging the Government to withdraw from the ICC treaty. Political 
interests related to the 2012 elections, inter- and intra-party divisions and alliances – 
sometimes along ethnic lines – contributed to the manner in which MPs voted. The main 
                                                 
42 Interview with an ODM MP, January 2011 
43 Interview with PNU MP, January 2011 
44 ODM MP, Ibid 
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motivation behind these political alliances is purely political self-preservation.45 Some 
politicians want to remain relevant by using the ICC process to appear as “martyrs” and 
making Kenyans believe that they have been sacrificed to protect some leaders. In addition, 
the alliances are being used as a buffer from the ICC process by raising emotions and threat 
of violence if the trials take place. The alliances are not based on any idea or ideology. It is a 
marriage of convenience.46 
128. These alliances and divisions have made it difficult to systematically implement reforms yet 
the window of opportunity to pass critical bills is fast closing. There are at least 25 bills that 
need to be passed to prepare the ground for the 2012 general elections. Of urgency is the 
need to establish the Independent Boundaries and Electoral Review Commission and pass 
new election laws. It is also important to note that the 2012 elections will be held under an 
entirely new structure of devolved government. Country governments, Assemblies and the 
Senate are all provided for in the new constitution, but the specific acts of parliament 
outlining their establishment and functions are not yet in place. With this kind of work 
ahead, a politically charged atmosphere poisoned by ethnic tension is the last thing Kenya 
needs. 
129. Party factionalism points to lack of institutionalisation despite the enactment of the Political 
Parties Act. Passed in 2007, and coming into effect a year later, the law provides a 
framework for the registration, regulation and funding of political parties. However, its 
enforcement has been weak. It is hoped that the recently formed Political Parties Dispute 
Tribunal will assist the parties to solve disputes expeditiously and amicably before they spill 
over into the coalition.   
130. The political parties need to also re-engineer themselves using the New Constitution. 
Chapter 6 on leadership and integrity should guide parties on how to elect office bearers and 
leaders in general. Enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 6 will help in instituting a 
mature political culture.47 The values and principles contained in the Constitution must be 
embedded in a new political culture; a new way of doing things, which unities all Kenyans 
around a strong national identity. 
Conclusion 
131. The Coalition Government was established for the purpose of implementing reforms. The 
passage of the New Constitution brings new opportunities -- it lays the basis for establishing 
a strong foundation for governance and leadership. However, implementing the New 
Constitution continues to face key challenges due to lack of cohesion within the coalition 
parties and the Government.  
132. The ICC process has brought new challenges. Some actors, who have a common interest in 
perpetuating impunity, have re-grouped to stall the ICC process as well as oppose any 
demands for criminal and political accountability. But the ICC is important in one respect: it 
is proving that the most powerful and influential people can also be held to account. Indeed, 
this is the first time that powerful people are being called to account. The success of the 
process will undoubtedly assist in creating a new culture promised under the New 
Constitution. 
                                                 
45
 Interview with a policy analyst, 25 March 2011 
46 Interview with a civil society key informant, 23 March 2011 
47 Remarks by a Cabinet minister during the Kenya National Dialogue Conference: Two Years on, Where are We? Held on 2-3 
December 2010 
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133. The Coalition Government is still divided over many issues. These divisions will deepen as 
the country moves close to the campaigns for 2012 elections. Urgently needed are coalition 
management structures to encourage cohesion and bipartisan support for the 
implementation of the New Constitution. Mechanisms to resolve disputes especially between 
the two principals should be carefully designed and effected to ensure that the disputes do 
not derail the New Constitution. National interests should supersede individual political 
interests. 
134. The two parties have to recognise that a New Constitution is an opportunity to do things 
differently. It does not give them an opportunity to entrench a culture of patronage. 
Appointments to new institutions, therefore, should be made on the basis of the values and 
principles of the New Constitution. Ethnic, political and party considerations that have in 
the past informed composition of public sector institutions should be done away with. 
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5.   THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
 
Introduction 
135. Agenda Item 4 of KNDR identified what was considered the long term issues and solutions. 
Addressing the ‘underlying causes of violence’ would prevent recurrence in future and lead 
to a better, more secure and prosperous nation. Under the framework of Agenda 4, the 
Coalition Government was to undertake a broad range of reforms, including constitutional, 
legal and institutional reforms. 
136. This section of the report examines progress in implementing the Constitution because it 
lays a firm foundation for other reforms 
Key Findings 
Summary of findings 
Constitutional, legal and institutional reforms 
• Government appoints members to key institutions for the implementation of 
the Constitution 
• Political interests and inadequate civic education threaten to derail the 
implementation process 
• President appoints members of the Judicial Service Commission 
• Police Reforms Implementation Committee drafts Bills to facilitate reforms 
• Ministry of Lands drafts the National Land Commission Bill, 2010 
• Government appoints a National Task Force on Devolved Governments 
• Government establishes institutions to promote national cohesion and unity 
• Some progress made in the fight against corruption  
Constitution Implementation Process 
137. A New Constitution was promulgated on 27 August 2010 following an affirmative 
referendum vote on 4 August. It enjoys high legitimacy, having been passed by close to 70 
per cent of the voters. Its framework comprises tight schedules on implementation. There is 
a five-year implementation timeframe, during which relevant institutions will be established 
and legislation passed.  
 
138. The New Constitution espouses important national values and principles of governance. 
New institutions and practices are supposed to operate within a context of new values and 
principles of governance. Integrity, transparency, democracy and people’s participation are 
some of the values underpinning the new style of governance.  
 
139. The New Constitution has restructured institutions of governance and established 
mechanisms for holding state officers accountable. It has also identified the obligations and 
responsibilities of citizens. On the whole, the New Constitution seeks to create a new 
political culture by introducing new values in how the state and its institutions relate to the 
society, as well as how citizens attend to the state. 
 
140. The time frame for implementing the New Constitution requires that the various organs of 
Government move with speed to set up new institutions and pass the required laws. It 
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provides for the establishment of three key institutions to spearhead the implementation of 
the New Constitution: the Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC), the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), and the Commission on 
Revenue Allocation (CRA). The Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee was 
established on 9 October 2010. The chairpersons and members to the CIC and the CRA were 
appointed on 30 December 2010. These appointments were behind schedule by over a 
month. And because of the delay in establishing them, the drafting of relevant laws and 
establishing of other institutions is also behind schedule.  The main challenges responsible 
for this are examined below.  
 
141. The CIC has the mandate to monitor, facilitate and oversee the implementation of the 
constitution. In fulfilling the above the CIC has, since its establishment, developed a draft 
work plan and held consultative and thematic based meetings to spearhead the 
constitutional implementation process. It has also reviewed and handed over to the Attorney 
General, five Bills amongst them the Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission 
(IEBC) Bill, the Independent Offices Bill and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission 
Bill. Further, the CIC has made an application to the Court of Appeal seeking interpretation 
of contentious provisions in the constitution.48 These measures are intended to lay the 
foundation for the comprehensive and timely implementation of the constitution within the 
stipulated five year time frame. 
 
142. The sixth schedule of the constitution espouses the various legislation that need to be 
enacted for the comprehensive implementation of the constitution. To date, two pieces of  
legislation have been enacted under the new constitution. These are the Judicial Service Act 
and the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act which are intended to foster reforms within 
the judicial system.49 By this April, parliament was debating several other bills including the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Review Commission Bill, Salaries and 
Remunerations Bill, Supreme Court Bill, and the Independent Commissions Bill. 
 
143. These are important steps in the implementation process. But the process is behind schedule 
and it may difficult to pass the required number by 27 August 2011 which Article 261 (1) of 
the constitution has set as the date for enacting 16 pieces of legislation (one year after the 
constitution came into effect). It is therefore necessary that parliament moves with speed to 
enact the relevant laws to oversee the process.  
Challenges to the Implementation Process 
144. The March 2011 survey asked people the difficulties that they would associate with the 
implementation of the New Constitution. 27 per cent identified lack of cohesion within the 
coalition government as one of the main challenges most likely to undermine 
implementation. Also, 25 per cent of respondents identified political interests as a difficulty 
while 10 per cent said lack of political will could undermine the implementation process. 
Corruption and contentious issues within the constitution were also cited as come on the 
impediments to the process.  The ICC process, in combination with the above mentioned 
factors are already impeding the implementation process.  
 
                                                 
48 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution. Quarterly Report, January- March 2011. See also The Star, Monday, 
March 7, 2011.Pg 22 
49 http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr 
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145. It is worth emphasising that vested political interests are responsible for the delays in 
establishing the institutions and constituting new bodies as required by the New 
Constitution. The process of implementing the New Constitution is largely dependent on the 
legislature to pass Bills and policies to smooth the process along. However, Parliament’s 
ability to enact these laws is threatened by vested interests within and outside the 
legislature. For instance, MPs declined to approve the names of the nominees to the CIC and 
CRA owing to disagreements over the delimitation of new constituencies as proposed by the 
Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC).  
 
146. Some MPs and commissioners within IIBRC questioned the validity of the commission’s 
proposals on the new constituencies, thereby initiating a dispute over whether IIBRC was 
objective in its work. This dispute spilled to Parliament, where MPs threatened not to 
approve the names proposed for the CIC and CRA. Such were the political interests that 
delayed establishing these bodies. Ultimately, it was only after a political deal on how the 
IIBRC’s report would be managed by a successor commission that nominees to the two 
constitution implementation commissions were approved. 
 
147. The CIC and the CRA are not the only bodies that have suffered the consequence of vested 
interests. The appointment of state officers for other bodies such as the Chief Justice, the 
Attorney General, Director of Public Prosecutions and the Controller of Budget has provoked 
a dispute between the two parties in the coalition, culminating in revocation of the 
appointments. The dispute centred on whether there were consultations between the two 
Principals before the President forwarded nominations to parliament for vetting. The 
ensuing acrimonious debate over these appointments demonstrated that political interests 
have begun to challenge implementation of the Constitution. There are actors who would 
like to implement the Constitution in a manner that suits their political interests rather than 
the public good. It is these narrow political interests that are determining the pace and 
nature of implementation. 
 
148. Implementation is also challenged by the presence of a critical group of influential people in 
both the bureaucracy and in Parliament who were not passionate about the New 
Constitution at the time of the referendum. They have a common interest in maintaining the 
status quo or implementing the New Constitution in a manner that does not threaten their 
interests. It is this group of non-passionate individuals that prefers a ‘business-as-usual’ 
approach.  
 
149. Inadequate civic awareness around the Constitution is also affecting public participation in 
the implementation process. Despite their overwhelming support for the Constitution, many 
Kenyans are still relatively unaware of its provisions. The lack of structured debate on the 
content of the new laws means that the public is not sufficiently involved in the debates on 
the implementation process.   
 
150. Inadequate civic education explains the low number of people who say they know much 
about the New Constitution. In the survey, only 12 per cent of Kenyans said they knew a lot 
about the New Constitution. Up to 70 per cent of respondents said they knew just some of it, 
while 11 per cent said they knew nothing. The main source of what the 12 per cent know 
about the Constitution came from the media. Of those who know a lot about the 
Constitution, 81 per cent obtained the information from the media, while another 52 per 
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cent said they read the constitution. Political parties and civil society groups, except religious 
organisations, appear not to be effectively involved in civic education. 
 
Figure 24: If you know a lot, what are the sources of what you know? 
 
(If a lot or just some of it):What are your sources of 
what you know about the constitution (multiple 
responses)
 
 
151. People are also not actively involved in debates about implementation. A middling 53 per 
cent of those interviewed said they were not involved in the discussions on constitutional 
implementation process. Only 11 per cent are very involved, meaning that they are aware 
about what is happening.  
 
152. Lack of awareness or involvement in discussions on implementation can lead to poor 
oversight. It can also reduce or stifle the demand side of reforms. Increased civic awareness 
is, therefore, critical for building strong oversight bodies and increasing the capacity to 
demand reforms. The CIC and civil society organisations need to embark on an elaborate 
civic education programme to increase awareness of the provisions and guarantees in the 
New Constitution.  
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Figure 25: How actively are you involved in public discussions about implementation of the new 
constitution? 
 
 
153. Up to 90 per cent of Kenyans say that the New Constitution is satisfactory in addressing 
their needs. In terms of the priorities for the Government, about 26 per cent want the New 
Constitution used to address the problem of security, 22 per cent want the Government to 
deliver jobs or employment, and 16 per cent want the Government to address corruption. 
These responses are captured in the Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: In the new constitutional implementation process, what do you want to see the Government 
prioritise? 
 
In the constitutional implementation process, what do 
you want to see the government prioritise?
 
54  
  
 
Other institutional reforms 
The Judiciary 
154. The New Constitution has anchored judicial reforms: The review and promulgation of the 
New Constitution has enabled the commencement of legislative and administrative 
measures to introduce reforms within the judicial system. Chapter Ten of the Constitution 
lays the foundation for judicial reforms and independence by providing for the 
establishment of a Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and a Judiciary Fund. It also 
establishes a Supreme Court, mandated to, among other things, adjudicate over presidential 
election disputes. The Constitution also recognises traditional courts as alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. These measures are intended to promote a transparent, accountable 
and independent judicial service.  
 
155. Judicial Service Commission (JSC) Appointed: A Judicial Service Commission mandated to 
oversee administrative, managerial and operational reform within the judiciary was 
established on 30 December 2010.50 As provided in the Constitution, the establishment of 
the JSC involved public and legislative participation in the appointment of members. Public 
participation in the management and administration of the judiciary has been enhanced by 
the inclusion of public representatives in the commission. 
 
156. Legislative and policy frameworks for judicial reforms enacted: The Judicial Service Act, 
2011, and the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act, 2011, have been enacted. The Judicial 
Service Act will promote efficiency and effectiveness in judicial service delivery and provide 
a basis for merit-based recruitment, appointment, discipline and removal of judicial 
officers.51 The Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act provides a legal framework through 
which serving and prospective judicial officers are vetted for their suitability to serve in the 
judiciary.52 
 
157. In order to improve the quality of service delivery, the judiciary is in the process of 
incorporating Information and Communication Technology (ICT) measures in the 
administration of justice. During this review period, it launched the Judiciary ICT Policy & 
Strategic Plan 2011-2013, which is intended to provide automated systems for the recording, 
preservation and retrieval of information, case and document management, SMS query 
service for information on the judiciary, and conducting virtual court sessions across the 
country.53 
 
158. The main challenge in undertaking comprehensive judicial reforms has been Executive 
dominance of the Judiciary. The lack of independence witnessed increased use of political 
considerations in appointments to key positions in the judiciary. This has tended to weaken 
delivery of services. It is hoped that the Judicial Service Commission and the ethos of the 
New Constitution will enhance service delivery, and particularly access to justice in the 
country. But as already mentioned, vested interests both within Parliament and outside it 
have begun to undermine the spirit to infuse new values in the governance of the society. 
Nomination of the Chief Justice by the President has already raised considerable concern. 
                                                 
50 Kenya Gazette, Special Issue Vol, CXII-No. 136 Dated 31 December, 2010.  Gazette Notice Number 16956 
51 Judicial Service Act.  
52 Vetting of Judge and Magistrate Act.  
53 The Judiciary, Launch of the Judiciary ICT Policy & Strategic Plan 2011-2013. Daily Nation,  14 October 2010, p. 31 
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These concerns should be addressed in a manner that lends credence and legitimacy to the 
process of appointment. The process has already been politicised and the public is, 
therefore, likely to see the new office bearers as representing certain political interests rather 
than facilitating reforms.   
Police Reforms 
159. The New Constitution has prioritised police reforms. Previous reports have indicated public 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the police owing to claims of corruption, brutality 
and a culture of extra-judicial killings by some members of the force. In January 2010, the 
Government appointed the Police Reforms Implementation Committee (PRIC) to oversee 
the implementation of the recommendations made by the National Task Force on police 
reforms.  
 
160. The Committee has drafted a number of Bills on police reforms which have been presented 
to stakeholders for discussion. These include the Independent Policing Oversight Authority 
Bill, 2010, which is intended to provide a civilian oversight mechanism over policing in the 
country; the National Police Service Bill, 2010, which places the Kenya Police Service and 
the Administration Police under one command structure and specifies the roles of the two 
security services; and the National Police Service Commission Bill -- meant to provide a legal 
framework for the administration of the National Police Service.54  
 
161. The New Constitution has emphasised the need for new values in future policing. The KNDR 
agreement itself underlined the need for comprehensive police reforms before the next 
General Election. No major reform has been undertaken in the force since then. However, 
the framework to guide such reforms is in place.  
 
162. Attitudinal change and political commitment are required for comprehensive police reforms. 
Although people’s confidence in police has been rising from 2008, still not many are 
satisfied with the work of the police. Up to 57 per cent of Kenyans are dissatisfied with the 
performance of the police, but 42 per cent are happy with their work. Although the 
committee has laid out the framework for reforms, there is need to emphasise the urgency of 
implementation before the next General Election. 
 
                                                 
54 Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, 2010, the National Police Service Bill, 2010, the National Police Service 
Commission Bill, 2010. 
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Figure 27: Thinking about the performance of the police after the passage of the constitution, would you 
say the police have done an excellent, good, poor or very poor job in protecting the rights of Kenyans? 
 
Conclusions 
163. The New Constitution has renewed optimism for a new culture of governance. Many 
Kenyans believe their lives will be better under the New Constitution. There are new values 
and principles of governance to direct relations between the Government and the people. 
These new values have created an environment for a new beginning.  
 
164. The main challenge to the implementation of the New Constitution is the vested political 
interests and divisions within the Coalition Government. Appointments are made on basis of 
ethno-political considerations and narrow interests. There is also limited public debate on 
policy implications of the New Constitution. Political disputes arising over appointments to 
new positions have deflected attention from how reforms could be carried out. 
 
165. A New Constitution means a new beginning. It is not business as usual. It also requires a 
high sense of commitment to the new values and principles guiding the conduct of 
Government and relations with the people. There is need to break from the old ways of doing 
things and give the new values a chance to guide the future of Kenya. Continuous education 
of the public on the various provisions of the Constitution is required to generate adequate 
demand for reform.  
 
57  
  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
166. This report has focused on several themes drawing from the KNDR agreement (the National 
Accord) as well as the New Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The review has again emphasised 
that the reforms undertaken both under the National Accord and the New Constitution of 
Kenya are critical for securing sustainable peace and democratic governance. The National 
Accord established the Coalition Government not as an end in itself, but a means to securing 
peace, security and justice. The coalition was formed not for the purpose of helping any 
individual but to promote the greater good of the nation. This value continues to guide the 
review of progress in the implementation of crucial reforms. 
 
167. This concluding section reiterates some of the outstanding findings and conclusions. It also 
discusses some recommendations to facilitate reforms, especially now that the Constitution 
has laid out a framework for fundamental changes in the practice of governance and politics.  
The Findings 
168. Data from the survey and field interviews reveal that the security situation in the country has 
improved and life is better than it was in 2008 and 2009. The number of people who feel the 
situation is worse has decreased from 70 per cent in 2008 to 17 per cent in December 2010. 
There are also more people who feel safer today than in 2008. Only 28 per cent said they felt 
safer in 2008 compared to 72 per cent who expressed this feeling in 2010.   
 
169. These findings show that political violence has not recurred since the time of signing the 
Accord. The situation has normalised and calm obtains. Whether this situation is sustainable 
depends on how politicians organise campaigns for the next General Election and, 
specifically, whether or not their differences will not result to conflicts among them. This 
observation is made in recognition that national level political conflicts rapidly and violently 
trickle down to the local level. Secondly, the underlying factors that contributed to the post-
2007 election crisis have not been systematically addressed. A New Constitution is only a 
beginning. Management of national level political differences and conflicts should be 
prioritised as the country prepares for the campaigns season ahead of the next General 
Election. 
 
170. The ICC process has begun in earnest after the Chief Prosecutor identified six people whose 
prosecution he will seek to pursue. This has heightened anxiety, which has in turn created 
political realignments for the purpose of securing the interests and political careers of senior 
politicians. But Kenyans are happy with the investigations. This is the first time influential 
and powerful people are being held to account. Kenyans are generally supportive of the ICC 
process and are confident that prosecutions will take place because prosecution is the only 
remaining option to hold people accountable. To many of them, senior and influential 
people have a common interest in perpetuating impunity and opposing measures for 
accountability. The ICC process, therefore, provides an opportunity to fight impunity. 
 
171. The IDPs problem is yet to be fully addressed. Some IDPs are still in transit camps in spite of 
the efforts of the Government and humanitarian agencies in providing funds for 
resettlement. The IDPs problem is yet to be resolved because they have become a major 
political resource for politicians. The IDPs question is increasingly used to advance political 
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interests of individual leaders. They use the IDPs to advance their own interests.  Thus the 
IDP problem has become so politicised that its solution cannot be divorced from the broad 
democratic governance reforms. The practice of inclusive politics and responsible leadership 
will help to obviate some of the causes of displacement. 
 
172. Cohesion within the coalition remains elusive; the Government is still divided over many 
issues. The ICC process has brought with it new challenges. The parties are divided on how 
to approach the problem of impunity. Internal factionalism within the political parties has 
added to this complexity. The parties appear fragmented along many lines, including ethno-
regional and personality fault lines. This factionalism is increasingly affecting 
implementation of the New Constitution. However, people view the Coalition Government as 
still relevant especially for the purpose of pushing the reform agenda forward. They want the 
Coalition to remain until 2012. 
Conclusion 
173. The New Constitution has renewed optimism for a new culture of governance.  It carries the 
hope of resolving issues identified under Agenda Item 4 and specifically issues that 
contributed to the post-election violence. Many Kenyans believe their lives will be better 
under the New Constitution. But there are new challenges facing its implementation. Among 
these are the deeply vested interests and an old political culture.  Short-term and narrow 
interests rather than the national ones appear to inform the process of implementation. 
Short-term foci, combined with lack of cohesion within the Government, and lack of 
leadership to manage political differences, mean that the country risks failing again.  
 
174. The majority of voters supported the New Constitution. They gave it legitimacy by approving 
it in large numbers. They aspired for a new Kenya and a new beginning. They voted for new 
values and new principles of governance. They chose to have ethical leadership and 
responsible leaders. Failing to live by the spirit and the values embraced by the New 
Constitution will disillusion the public, with certain negative consequences. 
 
175. Although the ICC process has introduced certain challenges, it is also an important 
opportunity for reforms. The process is laying the framework for fighting impunity and 
ensuring that leaders account for their actions. The ICC process is not aimed at communities 
but at fighting impunity and getting justice for the victims of the post-election violence. 
 
 
